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A CONSTANT TUG-OF-WAR: THE ROLE OF
THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Unbeknownst to Congress, the President has been in secret
negotiations with a foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”) that has been
harassing American citizens abroad.1 The President orders the Secretary
of State to contact the FTO leader to offer him precious metals to sustain
the local economy. Knowing that she has power under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j)
(“material support statute”) to release material support to FTOs, the
Secretary of State releases the support. 2 A week after this transaction,
Senator Jones finds out that the negotiation occurred without the
legislative branch’s knowledge. The Senator, being new in Washington,
D.C., is angry and a firm believer in checks and balances as prescribed by
the Constitution.3 In an attempt to find out information about the
negotiations, the Senator relies on the Case-Zablocki Act, which states that
the executive branch must notify the legislative branch about any
international agreement.4 The executive branch replies that the release of
material support during negotiations with FTOs does not fall under the
Case-Zablocki Act and that the executive branch is the “sole organ” of
foreign relations, therefore the Senator cannot receive any information. 5
Unsatisfied, the Senator researches years of cases and statutes to see how
the legislative branch lost influence in foreign relations and what can be
done to regain power.
As the material support statute is currently written, the legislative
branch receives no notice of the executive branch’s release of material
1
The following hypothetical is fictional and the work of the author. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189
(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2012) (defining a FTO as an organization that engages in or has the capacity to
engage in terrorist activity).
2
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of State to release material
support to FTOs); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2012) (defining material support as anything
tangible or intangible that can be given to FTOs in support of their mission).
3
See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 263–67 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(explaining the roles of each branch of the government in influencing the actions of the other
branches).
4
See Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2012) (outlining the steps the executive
branch must take to alert the legislative branch to international agreements). The CaseZablocki Act mandates the notification of the legislative branch anytime the executive branch
enters an international agreement. Id. § 112b(a); see also infra Part II.B (containing an in-depth
discussion of the Case-Zablocki Act).
5
See infra Part II.B–C (elaborating on the relationship between the Case-Zablocki Act and
the material support statute).

321

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2015], Art. 9

322

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

support to FTOs.6 The Constitution provides limited guidance on how the
legislative and executive branches should rely on each other when facing
foreign relations problems.7 The legislative branch retains some control
over the actions of the executive branch through appropriations, but the
material support statute does not contain any alternate means of
influence.8 To regain power in foreign relations, the legislative branch
enacted the Case-Zablocki Act.9 Including the Case-Zablocki Act in the
material support statute provides the legislative branch with a clear role
in the release of material support, resolves vagueness in the statute, and
ensures a unified and swift response by the government in a crisis. 10 The
legislative branch is not always involved in foreign relations, but creating
this new provision in the statute allows the executive branch to freely
negotiate, while providing a means to hold them responsible for their
actions.11
This Note suggests that the legislative branch can increase its
involvement in negotiating for the release of material support to FTOs by
amending the material support statute to include a provision for
congressional notification from the Case-Zablocki Act. Part II explores the
historical roles of the executive and legislative branches in foreign
relations and introduces the Case-Zablocki Act.12 Next, Part III examines
the role of the legislative branch in foreign relations, analyzes the extent
the legislative branch can oversee the actions of the executive branch, and
proposes a model federal statute amendment, incorporating procedures
from the Case-Zablocki Act into the material support statute.13 Finally,
Part IV summarizes and concludes this Note.14
II. BACKGROUND
The foundation of the executive and legislative branches’ role in
foreign relations, while based in part upon the Constitution, mainly arises
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (giving the executive branch power to release material support).
See infra Part II.A (determining the limits of constitutional influence upon the
relationship between the executive and legislative branches).
8
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (neglecting to include a role for the legislative branch).
9
See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (guiding the notification of the legislative branch when the
executive branch conducts agreements with international entities).
10
See infra Part III.D.1 (combining the material support statute and the Case-Zablocki Act).
11
See infra Part III.B–C (exhibiting the decrease of the legislative branch’s role in foreign
relations).
12
See infra Part II (providing a background for the relationship between the executive and
legislative branches in foreign relations).
13
See infra Part III (analyzing the type of role the legislative branch can have in foreign
relations and whether legislative notification should be included when negotiating with
FTOs).
14
See infra Part IV (concluding that the legislative branch should be included in the
material support statute).
6
7
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from the inherent, national powers of the United States.15 The roles of the
executive and legislative branches fluctuate depending on the situation
facing the nation.16 The executive branch retains the ability to govern
foreign policy and initiate negotiations with FTOs, while the legislative
branch has few effective means of oversight.17
To determine the role of the legislative branch in negotiations with
FTOs, Part II.A describes the increase of the executive branch’s role in
foreign relations and the subsequent decrease of the legislative branch’s
role in foreign relations.18 Next, Part II.B introduces the Case-Zablocki Act
and discusses its impact on the legislative branch’s role in foreign
relations.19 Finally, Part II.C explains the role of the material support
statute in foreign relations. 20
A. Problems with Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations
Traditionally, the executive branch is the source of foreign relations
power in the United States Government.21 While the executive branch
15
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting the legislative branch with the power to
legislate); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (defining the legislative branch’s power to make
necessary laws for each branch to work properly); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (outlining the
power of the executive branch in treaty-making and appointments); see also MICHAEL D.
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 13 (2007) (finding that the powers of
the branches in foreign relations are “inherent” because of the “conception of nationality”).
16
See RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 131 (explaining that the foreign relations power vested in
other branches of the government provide an important check on the power of the executive).
17
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2012) (giving power to the Secretary of State to provide material
support with no mention of the legislative branch in this portion of the statute). The material
support statute states:
No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the
term “personnel,” “training,” or “expert advice or assistance” if the
provision of that material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization was approved by the Secretary of State with the
concurrence of the Attorney General. The Secretary of State may not
approve the provision of any material support that may be used to carry
out terrorist activity.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (delegating the power of treaty-making to both
branches, but giving broader power to the executive branch).
18
See infra Part II.A (exploring the relationship and balance of powers between the
executive and legislative branches in foreign relations).
19
See infra Part II.B (introducing the Case-Zablocki Act).
20
See infra Part II.C (focusing on the evolution of the material support statute).
21
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (referring to the executive branch as the sole representative of the people in
foreign relations); David D. Newsom, The Executive Branch in Foreign Policy, in THE
PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 93, 93 (Edmund S. Muskie et al. eds., 1986)
(identifying the executive branch as the sole power in foreign relations). The Constitution
also grants wide foreign policy powers to the executive branch:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;
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broadened its power within foreign relations, the legislative branch
became marginalized in foreign policy. 22 Part II.A.1 explores the
Constitution’s prohibition on the legislative branch taking a leadership
role in foreign relations, designating the power mostly to the executive
branch.23 Next, Part II.A.2 discusses United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., where the Supreme Court gave the executive branch power to
conduct foreign relations and stated that the legislative branch should
cede that power to the executive branch. 24 Finally, Part II.A.3 examines
current means of congressional notification in foreign relations and its
impact on the executive branch in conducting foreign negotiations.25

and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Not only did the Constitution grant the executive branch power
over treaty-making and diplomatic appointments, but later cases continued to reinforce this
notion by granting the executive branch increased power in making foreign policy. See id.
(granting the executive branch sole power over treaty-making with the Senate’s consent);
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting the strength of the executive
branch in foreign relations); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936) (regulating the field of foreign negotiations and relations to the purview of the
executive branch unless statutorily stated otherwise).
22
See Norman J. Ornstein, The Constitution and the Sharing of Foreign Policy Responsibility,
in THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 35, 64 (Edmund S. Muskie et al. eds.,
1986) (pointing out that even after 200 years of history, there is still no concrete framework
for legislative input in treaty-making and other foreign policy issues).
23
See infra Part II.A.1 (exploring the limits of the Constitution); see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 1 (vesting legislative power to the Congress); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (permitting
Congress to make laws to carry out the duties of each branch of the government).
Additionally, a working relationship between the executive and legislative branch depends
on the participation of each branch:
[T]he President can communicate and announce policy but must rely on
Congress to implement policy legislatively.
Congress cannot
communicate or announce policies but can pass domestic laws with
foreign affairs implications . . . In areas outside its enumerated powers,
Congress cannot take the initiative but can legislate in support of foreign
affairs goals established by the President.
RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 211.
24
See infra Part II.A.2 (demonstrating the lasting effect Curtiss-Wright had upon the
legislative branch’s role in foreign relations).
25
See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the current ways the legislative branch can influence
foreign relations).
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Constitutional Allowances and Limits

The Framers, when drafting the Constitution in 1789, did not provide
specific roles for the executive and legislative branches in foreign
relations.26 The original intent of the Constitution was to separate and
distinguish the powers of each branch of the government, but the foreign
relations power of the executive and legislative branches stemmed from
an inherent power.27 The Constitution granted the executive branch
power to make treaties and appoint officials, but remained silent on the
executive branch’s ability to conduct other foreign affairs, like terminating

26
See Ornstein, supra note 22, at 35 (overlapping the roles of the executive and legislative
branches rather than delegating certain roles to each branch). The powers of the executive
branch begin in Article II, section 1 of the United States Constitution, which states “[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Additionally, the treaty-making power shows that foreign relations powers
are inherently vested in the entire national government. See generally Holmes v. Jennison, 39
U.S. 540, 579 (1840) (holding that the ability to surrender fugitives looking for asylum belongs
solely to the Federal Government under the Constitution so that there would not be conflict
between the states). “It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as
regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation; and to cut off all communications
between foreign governments[.]” Id. at 575.
27
See RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 13 (basing the “inherent” foreign policy power of the
government in the theory of the nation); David Gray Adler, The Constitution and Presidential
Warmaking, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 183, 213
(David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (placing the power of the executive branch
in foreign relations in an “inherent power” that comes from outside of the Constitution). See,
e.g., Alissa C. Wetzel, Beyond the Zone of Twilight: How Congress and the Court Can Minimize
the Dangers and Maximize the Benefits of Executive Orders, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 385, 388–89 (2007)
(expanding upon the Framers’ intent that the executive branch has express and implied
powers under the Constitution).
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treaties and engaging in executive agreements. 28 The executive branch’s
ability to conduct these extra-constitutional affairs stemmed from “the
presidential responsibility of representing the country in foreign affairs,
the authority to receive ambassadors, the role of commander-in-chief of
the military, and the obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.’”29 The combination of the Constitution’s treaty-making power
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (dictating executive powers as treaty-making and
appointments); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–18 (delegating a variety of powers to the
legislative branch, but not including treaty-making). The Framers’ explicit mention of treatymaking in the Constitution shows that the Framers realized the binding nature and
importance of treaties and did not want the federal government to enter into treaties easily
or without careful consideration. See Robert J. Spitzer, The President, Congress, and the Fulcrum
of Foreign Policy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 85,
85–86 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (discussing the importance of treatymaking in Article II of the Constitution and the Founders’ opinions upon the powers of the
executive branch). Originally, the powers of the executive and legislative branches were
meant to be shared when dealing with foreign entities. See id. at 86 (explaining that early
drafts of the Constitution wanted the executive and legislative branches to consult one
another in foreign relations). During the course of the Constitution’s drafting, the Framers
first intended the legislative branch to have treaty-making power. RAMSEY, supra note 15, at
213–14. Some of the delegates determined that Article I gave an appropriate amount of
power to the legislative branch to make foreign treaties, and Article II section 2 would be an
alternative method. Id. However, this potential power shift was not challenged after the
ratification of the Constitution, thus the legislative branch was shut out of any direct
communications with international governments. Id. at 214.
Due to the Constitution’s silence on ending treaties and executive agreements, the
Supreme Court stepped in to interpret the amount of power the executive branch has in nonenumerated foreign relations issues. See Spitzer, supra note 28, at 88, 94–97 (elaborating on
the silence of the Constitution regarding ending treaties and executive agreements). For
example, Goldwater v. Carter examined President Carter’s treaty termination with China and
while the Supreme Court dismissed the case for nonjusticiability, the case allowed the
executive branch to unilaterally extinguish treaties with foreign governments. Id. at 88–89;
see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001–02 (1979) (holding that the appellate court’s
decision was vacated and the case remanded to the district court for dismissal because this
case was not ripe for judicial review).
Alexander Hamilton supported the idea of allowing both the legislative and executive
branches to be involved in foreign relations decision making outside of the specific
enumerated powers of the Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 3, at 264 (“In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies
in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.”). By giving the federal government the power to govern itself
through the inherent balance of powers, the government will be self-sustaining and immune
to dictatorship. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 302c (1987) (explaining that the executive branch has wide discretion on what types
of international agreements could be made).
29
Spitzer, supra note 28, at 95. Executive agreements can range in shape and size,
including routine matters and major international agreements. Id. Although the
Constitution does not specifically discuss executive agreements, this form of agreement
between nations is now acceptable and is the normal course of business. See LOUIS HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 219–20 (1996) (explaining that
28
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and external interpretations of its inherent powers furnished a general
foundation for how the executive branch should conduct itself when
engaging in foreign negotiations.30
The Constitution vaguely included the legislative branch in the field
of foreign relations to maintain the check and balance system. 31
Traditionally, the Constitution restricted the legislative branch to
domestic matters, but provided avenues for the legislative branch to
influence foreign relations.32 The Constitution allowed the legislative
branch “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.” 33
Further, the
Constitution delegated the authority to manage appropriations to the
legislative branch, thus giving the legislative branch the monetary means
to check the executive branch’s power.34 If the executive branch or the
legislative branch overstepped the boundaries laid out by the
Constitution, the judiciary interpreted the intentions of the Constitution

executive agreements are important because they allow for a faster government process).
While the executive agreements are helpful foreign relations tools, they do not always carry
the force of law, and can be superseded by an act of Congress. Id. at 228.
30
See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 26–27 (distinguishing the roles of the executive and
legislative branches in conducting foreign relations). “The constitutional distribution of
foreign relations powers is rooted in the antecedents of the Constitution, and grew out of
dissention, vacillation, and compromise at the Constitutional Convention.” Id. at 27. The
legislative and executive branches constantly jockey for power in foreign relations, and the
lack of clarity in the Constitution helps foster this relationship. Id. at 29.
31
See RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 64 (maintaining that including checks and balances was
important for the fledgling government).
32
See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 43–44 (1997) (stating that the legislative
branch can choose whether to influence foreign policy); Ornstein, supra note 22, at 38–39
(showing that the Framers intended the legislative branch to handle foreign policymaking,
but as time went on, that power shifted to the executive branch).
33
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
34
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (regulating the “power of the purse” to the legislative
branch). The inherent power of the legislative branch to legislate comes from Article I section
8, which allows Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” and “[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18; see also RAMSEY,
supra note 15, at 197 (describing the constitutional foundation for the legislative branch’s
power to legislate). The legislative branch, through these monetary means, can make laws
affecting foreign policy without overstepping the separation of powers and decreasing the
executive branch’s power. See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 65–67 (expanding upon the
underlying power granted to the legislative branch by the Constitution through the Foreign
Commerce Clause).
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and guided the actions of the respective branches. 35 Restricting executive
branch power through appropriations and legislation were important
checks on the Constitution’s broad grant of foreign relations powers. 36
Not only did the Constitution govern the role of each branch in foreign
relations, but it also limited the reach of the branches into the actions of
another.37 The Framers were especially concerned with the overreach of
government and sought to prevent the branches from creating a
dictatorship or autocracy.38 Although the Constitution and subsequent
35
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 652–53 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (holding that the legislative branch may increase executive branch power in
foreign relations when a national emergency makes expediency necessary). See generally
Donald L. Robinson, Presidential Prerogative and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 114, 122 (David Gray Adler
& Larry N. George eds., 1996) (restating that the executive branch can act unilaterally in cases
of national emergency, but in Youngstown, there was no national emergency, thus, the
Supreme Court held that the executive branch could not usurp the legislative power of the
legislative branch).
36
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (stating
that foreign negotiations will vest in the executive branch, but it must follow the parameters
set by the legislative branch); see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring)
(specifying that the executive branch must obey specific procedures given by the legislative
branch in crisis situations and that the ability to act is determined by the severity of the
situation); Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing that
the legislative branch may be as specific as it wants in any instructions to the executive
branch).
37
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 3, at 263 (explaining that the government
functions through checks and balances). Hamilton specifically focused on the need for each
branch of the government to have its own foundation and identity:
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise
of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is
admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is
evident that each department should have a will of its own[.]
Id. The balance of the federal government would use one branch to strengthen another,
weaker branch and then vice versa, depending on the situation. See id. at 265 (protecting the
interests of different factions within the government is essential to a well-balanced
government). See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 251–52 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro
ed., 2009) (agreeing that the branches do share some power, but one does not have a direct
influence over the other); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 103 (describing the three branches of
the government as entities that “share and compete for power—unable to combine into a
tyrannical system, and yet able to work together to accomplish necessary ends”).
38
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 50–53 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (writing
that the purpose of instituting a republic was to ensure meaningful representation of the
populace). By ensuring proper representation, the federal government could function as a
tool of the people and with that goal as its focus, the government would be less susceptible
to corruption or faction. See id. (explaining the philosophy of the republic). The federal
government was meant to incorporate debate and disagreement, albeit in a steady and
formal manner:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention
of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the
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interpretations stressed the separation of powers and the importance of
checks and balances, these theories have not been manifested in foreign
relations.39 There was a disconnect between ideals regarding the
separation and balance of powers exhibited in The Federalist Papers and the
application of those ideals to the executive and legislative branches in
foreign relations.40 The apparent discontinuity between the theory and
application of keeping the legislative and executive branches separate in
foreign relations offered an opportunity for interpretation and the
expansion or contraction of power in that realm. 41
The foreign relations power of the executive and legislative branches
were not completely determined in the Constitution, and may have

inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental
powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
39
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noticing that the executive
branch powers are not as constitutionally enumerated as the power of the legislative branch).
Even if the Framers did not specifically include the power of the executive branch in the
Constitution, the powers of territory acquisition, expelling aliens, and ability to make
international agreements that are not treaties, are “inherently inseparable” from the theory
of nationality. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(emphasizing the expanded role of the executive branch in foreign relations, even though
the powers are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution). See generally SILVERSTEIN,
supra note 32, at 39 (determining that the power to conduct foreign affairs came from outside
of the Constitution, but should not be taken any less seriously).
40
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–18 (delegating powers to the legislative branch, but not
including treaty-making); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (dictating the executive powers as
treaty-making and appointments); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the executive branch
may give the legislative branch recommendations on how to handle situations); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 3, at 264 (outlining the importance of the balance of powers:
“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”). At the
Constitutional Convention, the Framers argued about the involvement of the legislative
branch in foreign relations. See Ornstein, supra note 22, at 38 (noting the difficulty to
compromise during the Constitutional Convention). Although the Framers intended for the
legislative branch to have more influence in foreign policymaking, the worries of acting
quickly and maintaining secrecy won over the debate and the legislative branch was only
allowed to influence the executive branch through appropriations. See id. (giving the
executive branch power over the foreign relations decision making). For example, the
Framers wrote that “[t]he qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management
of foreign negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in those transactions[.]”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 379 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
41
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 40, at 380–81 (opening the debate about the extent
of the executive branch’s role in foreign relations); see also New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 728–29 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (attributing unshared power to
the executive branch to conduct foreign affairs, but cautioning the executive branch about
the “awesome responsibility” of the task).
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stemmed from extra-constitutional sources.42 This theory, similar to the
Constitution, allocated most of the foreign relations power to the
executive branch and left the legislative branch to deal with domestic
issues.43 This interpretation of the constitutional balance of powers
created a precedent for the lack of legislative branch involvement in
negotiations with FTOs.44 The Constitution’s ambiguity allowed the
executive branch to determine foreign policy without legislative branch
notification or oversight.45 The precedent for excluding the legislative
branch in foreign relations continued throughout the jurisprudence of the
twentieth century, highlighted in the dicta of United States v. CurtissWright.46

42
See Adler, supra note 27, at 213 (expanding upon the ideas of inherent power, the effect
of the Constitution, and extra-constitutional sources of power and interpretation).
43
See RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 213–14 (relying on the few enumerated powers in the
Constitution granted to the executive branch to show that the legislative branch has little
recognized role in foreign relations). However, the legislative branch could use the
enumerated powers of appropriations and appealing to the judiciary to influence the
executive branch in foreign relations. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (granting appropriations
power to the legislative branch).
44
See supra Part II.A (stating the history of constitutional interpretation and its effects on
foreign relations).
45
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (listing the role of the legislative branch in foreign
relations, but only in treaty-making); see also supra Part II.A (relating the historical issues in
legislative branch involvement in foreign policy).
46
See infra Part II.A.2 (introducing the influence of Curtiss-Wright in foreign policy).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol50/iss1/9

Spartz: A Constant Tug-of-War: The Role of the Legislative Branch in Neg

2015]
2.

A Constant Tug-of-War

331

United States v. Curtiss-Wright: Expanding the Executive Branch’s Role
in Foreign Relations at the Expense of the Legislative Branch

The Constitution’s grant of foreign relations power to the executive
branch influenced Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-Wright.47 In
Curtiss-Wright, the Court determined that the executive branch was the
“sole organ” of foreign negotiations. 48 While Justice Sutherland faced
critics, this proposition continued the inherent power movement in the
United States.49 By allowing the executive branch to be the “sole organ”
in foreign relations, Justice Sutherland closed off any methods for the
legislative branch to influence the executive branch in foreign relations. 50
47
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–16 (1936) (showing the
relationship between Justice Sutherland’s holding and the inherent foreign relations power
of the executive branch). The Curtiss-Wright Exportation Company sold weapons to Bolivia
without authorization from the government. See id. at 311 (expanding upon the reasons the
Curtiss-Wright Company sold arms to Bolivia). The legislative branch issued a resolution
that forbade companies from selling arms and munitions to countries involved in conflict in
South America. Id. at 312. By limiting the sale of arms and munitions, the government hoped
to enhance the chances of peace in the region. Id. President Roosevelt issued an executive
order forbidding the sale of armaments to Bolivia and Paraguay. See id. at 312–13 (quoting
President Roosevelt’s executive order); RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 14 (describing President
Roosevelt’s embargo on arms sales to certain countries). This order expanded the reach of
the executive branch, directly impacting the decisions of American companies. See CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 312–13 (prohibiting American companies from selling weapons to Bolivia
and Paraguay). Justifying President Roosevelt’s expansion of executive power, Justice
Sutherland wrote that in the “vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation” and the executive branch “is the constitutional representative
of the United States with regard to foreign nations.” Id. at 319. Cf. David Gray Adler, Court,
Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 19, 37–38 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (revealing the
executive branch as the “sole organ in foreign affairs,” but this is a misnomer because the
other branches also influence foreign policy).
48
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (holding that the executive branch’s power in foreign
relations is not subject to approval by the legislative branch, but the executive branch must
still conform to the Constitution).
49
See Adler, supra note 27, at 213 (stating that Curtiss-Wright is the authoritative case
analyzed when discussing the inherent powers of the executive branch). Adler attributes
Justice Sutherland’s reliance on inherent powers as a “reading of Anglo-American legal
history” instead of groundbreaking legal analysis. Id.; see also RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 17
(re-emphasizing that Justice Sutherland created his theory based on pre-Constitution
historical works and logical arguments regarding the executive branch’s power in foreign
relations). Justice Sutherland’s theory meant that “[t]he Constitution’s structure of national
powers delegated by the states . . . simply did not apply (and logically could not apply) to
foreign affairs.” RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 16. Although other courts use Justice Sutherland’s
theory of inherent power, Adler comments that the real power granted to the executive
branch to be the “sole arbiter” of foreign relations should be founded in the Constitution and
not in external sources. Adler, supra note 27, at 214–15.
50
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (determining the exclusion of the legislative branch
is due to the inherent powers of the executive branch).
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This case popularized and expanded the notion that the executive branch
was the only voice in American foreign policy and that the legislative
branch solely dealt with domestic issues.51
Curtiss-Wright echoed the continuing progress of the executive
branch’s expansion of power in foreign relations. 52 For example, Justice
Sutherland invoked The Act of 1795 to justify the power of the executive
branch to make foreign relations decisions with little to no inclusion of the
judicial or legislative branches.53 Many of the statutes passed by the
legislative branch, before this case, authorized the executive branch to act

See Adler, supra note 47, at 26 (discussing the effect of Curtiss-Wright on the executive
and legislative branches); RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that Justice Sutherland’s
theory of inherent executive power is typically invoked and favored by Presidents and
members of the executive branch). See also David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 953, 955 (2014) (emphasizing that the origins of the “one-voice doctrine” stem from the
Constitution). Today’s proponents of the “one-voice doctrine” could be seen as an extension
of Justice Sutherland’s theory of the executive branch being the “sole organ” of foreign
relations. Id. at 954–56. The “one-voice doctrine” holds that the United States Government
must speak as one to avoid negative repercussions from other countries. Id. at 955–56.
Having the branches work together is essential for a cohesive government response against
terrorism. See id. at 954 (addressing the prominence of the “one-voice doctrine” in foreign
affairs). While Moore sees some value in the idea of having one branch as the sole voice for
American foreign policy, he also acknowledges and addresses the flaws in the system. See
id. at 979 (introducing the fatal flaws of the “one-voice doctrine”).
52
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322 (condemning the attempt to have the legislative
branch lay down a general rule forbidding the executive branch from exerting certain
powers). Not only does Curtiss-Wright expand the power of the executive branch, but Justice
Sutherland advocates for the judiciary’s involvement in foreign affairs rather than the
legislative branch. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 37 (establishing that Justice Sutherland
wanted a broad interpretation of what the executive branch could do in foreign relations).
53
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322–25 (highlighting Acts giving the executive branch
power to act unilaterally in foreign relations). For example, one of the Acts mentioned by
Justice Sutherland stated:
That in cases connected with the security of the commercial interest of
the United States, and for public purposes only, the President of the
United States be, and hereby is authorized to permit the exportation of
arms, cannon and military stores, the law prohibiting the exportation of
the same to the contrary notwithstanding.
AN ACT, 1 STAT. 444, 3RD CONG. (2nd Sess.) 1795. Not only did the legislature grant the
executive branch wide discretion to restrict the sale of arms to other countries, but the Act of
February 9, 1799, made it lawful for the executive branch to allow or prohibit actions with
the French Republic as the interest of the United States required. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S.
at 322–23 (using the Act as an example of unilateral executive power in foreign relations).
While the courts play an important role in oversight of the executive and legislative branches,
the courts’ role in foreign relations is one of deference to the other branches. See id. at 322
(regulating the courts’ role in foreign relations to deciding matters of law).
51
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unilaterally in foreign relations. 54 Considering the effect of statutes on the
executive branch’s role in foreign relations, Justice Sutherland held that
foreign relations was a job for the entire national government, but the
executive branch retained specific power in the realm of international
negotiations.55 The expansion of the executive branch’s role in foreign
relations in Curtiss-Wright followed the foundation laid in the
Constitution.56
Justice Sutherland advocated for the executive branch to have power
over the legislative branch in foreign relations, and by extension, foreign
negotiations.57 The legislative branch may choose to vest or limit power

54
See generally Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 324 n.2 (outlining all of the ways statutes have
permitted the executive branch to act without legislative input in foreign relations). Some of
the Acts listed in the footnote of Curtiss-Wright include: Act of December 19, 1806, 2 Stat. 411
(authorizing the executive branch to suspend embargos passed by Congress); Act of April
22, 1808, 2 Stat. 490 (allowing the executive branch to stop embargos if hostilities cease and
the United States can claim relative safety); Act of January 7, 1824, 4 Stat. 3 (stating that the
executive branch can suspend tonnage charges); Act of June 19, 1886, 24 Stat. 79, 82, 83
(giving the executive branch power to deny entry to vessels belonging to countries offending
the United States); Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 475 (authorizing the executive branch to
withhold entry of goods from offending countries); Act of March 23, 1874, 18 Stat. 23
(permitting the executive branch “to suspend an act providing for the exercise of judicial
functions by ministers, consuls and other officers of the United States in the Ottoman
dominions and Egypt”). Id.
55
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329 (holding that the Court should allow the progress of
the legislation and the traditional methods of using the executive branch to further foreign
relations to regulate itself). The Court also determined that the history and tradition of the
legislative branch ceding some of its power to the executive branch justified the expansion
of the executive branch’s power in foreign relations. See id. at 327–28 (highlighting the
history of showing that the executive branch should take the helm in foreign relations).
56
See id. at 329 (finding that this particular expansion of the Constitution’s meaning was
acceptable and should not be disturbed by the Court). Justice Sutherland wanted the United
States to be a world power albeit without giving up the Constitution’s original separation of
powers. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 41 (discussing Justice Sutherland’s underlying
motivation in giving the executive branch the power to determine the course of foreign
relations). Justice Sutherland’s idea justifying the holding of Curtiss-Wright and influencing
subsequent legislation and court rulings worked; however, a closer look revealed that Justice
Sutherland’s reasoning was flawed. See id. (showing that a look at the policies of the
executive branch veered toward the traditional and the Constitution).
57
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20 (explaining the difference between the power of
the legislative branch and the executive branch). Justice Sutherland wrote:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with
an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power,
but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations—a power which does not require as
a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the Constitution.
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to the executive branch through statutes, but Justice Sutherland
admonished the legislature to provide the executive branch with broad
discretion in foreign negotiations. 58 Justice Sutherland relied upon a long
tradition of the legislative branch authorizing executive branch’s actions
in foreign negotiations to justify increasing the executive branch’s power,
but left the scope of decision making to the executive branch.59 CurtissWright provided a broad framework for the executive branch in foreign
relations, effectively increasing the role of the executive branch in foreign
negotiations, while reducing the legislative branch’s role.60 To lessen the
influence of Curtiss-Wright, thus increasing the legislative branch’s foreign

Id. The Constitution specifically balanced power between the three branches of government,
but the details and specific jobs in the field of foreign relations were not enumerated and
may be implied from extra-constitutional sources. See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 22
(elaborating on the Constitution’s vagueness on the executive and legislative branches’
specific roles in foreign relations).
58
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320–21 (invoking the words of President Washington to
explain the necessity of keeping the power of foreign negotiations in the hands of the
executive branch). President Washington explored the ramifications of foreign negotiations:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success
must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion
a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions
which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely
impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future
negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger
and mischief, in relation to other powers.
1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRES. 194–95 (March 30, 1796) (James D. Richardson ed.,
1896). Washington’s administration created a strong inference of power in foreign relations
around the executive branch. See Ornstein, supra note 22, at 45 (outlining President
Washington’s practice of excluding the legislative branch from treaty making).
59
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 324 (stating that the statutes are full of the legislative
branch authorizing the executive branch to act in foreign relations and that the decisions
made by the executive branch are afforded wide deference); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why
the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 158, 159–60 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996)
(relating Justice Sutherland’s broad framework for the executive branch’s role in foreign
relations to the practical aspects of decision making and leaving the how and why of the
decisions up to the discretion of the executive branch).
60
See Koh, supra note 59, at 159–60 (regulating the power to conduct foreign relations to
the exclusive purview of the executive branch). While Justice Sutherland’s views of
executive power have not been universally accepted, the Court’s subsequent use and
affirmation of the theory of sole executive power in foreign relations continued to invade the
field of foreign relations. See Adler, supra note 47, at 45 (“There can be little doubt that
Curtiss-Wright has overwhelmed the foreign relations law of the United States.”). See
generally HENKIN, supra note 29, at 20–21 (discussing the existence of Justice Sutherland’s
theory in constitutional law, but hinting that there is no exact science to what powers the
executive branch retains in foreign relations).
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policy role, the legislative branch uses alternative oversight measures such
as appropriations and the electorate.61
3.

Current Congressional Oversight Measures in Foreign Relations

Case law and statutes have steadily decreased the power of the
legislative branch in foreign relations; however, the legislative branch
retained the power of oversight in some areas of foreign relations. 62 The
legislative branch exercised oversight in voicing opinions about the
executive branch’s actions in foreign relations, advising the executive
branch on a specific course of action, or conducting strict oversight of the
executive branch.63 This section discusses the ways the legislative branch
remains influential in foreign relations, specifically in foreign negotiations
where there is little statutory direction.64
One way the legislative branch checked the power of the executive
branch in foreign relations was by publicly voicing an opinion about the
procedure or content of the policy.65 The legislative branch typically
opined about executive branch decision making during on-record
proceedings at the Capitol.66 This forum was not governed by the
61
See infra Part II.A.3 (describing the methods used by the legislative branch to influence
the decisions of the executive branch in foreign relations).
62
See generally HENKIN, supra note 29, at 82 (pointing out that the legislative branch has
multiple ways to influence the executive branch); Susan Webb Hammond, Congress in Foreign
Policy, in THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 67, 86 (Edmund S. Muskie et
al. eds., 1986) (explaining the increase of legislative oversight in foreign relations).
63
See Hammond, supra note 62, at 86–90 (outlining the ways the legislative branch can
oversee the executive branch, including legislative veto, reporting requirements, information
and consultation, and through legislative staff members). Generally, the legislative branch
is limited in the ways it can function in foreign relations. See generally RAMSEY, supra note 15,
at 200 (providing the legislative branch with limited powers such as legislating, collecting
taxes, and regulating commerce).
64
See infra Part II.A.3 (examining the ways the legislative branch can still influence foreign
relations without having direct authority to deal with other nations).
65
See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 82 (receiving support from important congressional
members should be important to the executive branch and help to maintain a balance of
powers regarding foreign relations); see generally Hammond, supra note 62, at 90 (defining
the legislative branch’s role as more outspoken because of the new perspectives brought by
various congressional members).
66
See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. H7062–63 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2013) (statement of Rep. Holding)
(speaking out against President Obama’s quest for a nuclear agreement through negotiations
with Iran); Michel Oksenberg, Congress, Executive-Legislative Relations, and American China
Policy, in THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 207, 225 (Edmund S. Muskie
et al. eds., 1986) (including formal legislative hearings as a means for the legislative branch
to influence the executive branch in foreign relations decision making). The ability of the
legislative branch to influence the executive branch through hearings should not be taken
lightly:
[W]hether in connection with particular legislation, appropriations,
appointments, or under undefined and undifferentiated investigative
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Constitution or statute, rather it was an inherent part of the democratic
process.67 Declaring these thoughts on the record might indirectly
influence the executive branch, but it was not required to heed the advice
or admonitions of the legislative members.68
The executive branch does not have to consider the opinions of the
legislative branch, but the executive branch must answer to the general
populace.69 The general public’s pleasure or displeasure with the
legislative or executive branch’s actions in a foreign negotiation can
influence the shape of foreign policy.70 According to the United States’
democratic ideals, the legislative branch represented the interests of the

power, Congressional committees and individual members of Congress
have opportunities to inquire, cross-examine, expose, criticize, even
harass and threaten executive officials engaged in the conduct of foreign
policy, and the need to justify to members of Congress is a not
insignificant influence on Executive policy.
HENKIN, supra note 29, at 82.
67
HENKIN, supra note 29, at 82 (stating that the legislative branch retains informal, extraconstitutional powers such as influence in the field of foreign relations). Usually the
legislative branch debates foreign policy at the committee and subcommittee level, with most
exchanges becoming a part of the formal record. See Hammond, supra note 62, at 84
(describing the processes used by the legislative branch to discuss foreign policy).
“[H]earings are used for information gathering, to build a record, for legislative history.” Id.
These hearings provide formal means for the legislative branch to oversee the actions of the
executive branch without usurping the executive branch’s power to conduct foreign
relations. See id. (stressing the importance of legislative hearings in the foreign relations
process).
68
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 14 (distinguishing the influence of the legislative
branch against having actual control of an aspect of foreign policy); see also Oksenberg, supra
note 66, at 227 (describing the legislative branch’s influence as “fragmented, highly personal,
and often contradictory”). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (listing treaty-making as a time the
executive branch should listen to the legislative branch).
69
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 196–97 (establishing the relationship between the
legislative branch and the electoral support base). The relationship between the executive
and legislative branches creates an important dichotomy in American politics, “For
Presidents need Congress, have to get along with it, must take its views into account; and
individual members of Congress often reflect public opinion and can create opinion for or
against Presidential policies.” HENKIN, supra note 29, at 81.
70
See Mark J. Oleszek & Walter J. Oleszek, Institutional Challenges Confronting Congress
After 9/11: Partisan Polarization and Effective Oversight, in CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF
NATIONAL SECURITY 45, 60–61 (David P. Auerswald & Colton C. Campbell eds., 2012)
(emphasizing the “watchdog” role of the legislative branch as being important to keep the
general public informed so that on election day, the voters may make informed decisions);
see also SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 200 (“[The legislative branch] must weigh the negative
incentive of blame avoidance against the positive incentives of claiming credit and
improving American policy.”).
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general population in Washington, D.C.71 The constituents’ sentiments
on a particular issue may directly or indirectly influence the
representative and cause them to vote or act a certain way.72 The cohesive
attitude of the nation about a negotiation with a FTO may sway the
executive branch, but statutorily, the executive branch does not have to
adhere to these sentiments.73
Under statute, the legislative branch had little authority over foreign
negotiations; however, the longstanding precedent of congressional
advice kept the legislative branch involved in foreign policy. 74 The
executive branch may ask the legislative branch for advice or a report on
the problem facing the nation.75 This process can happen throughout the
foreign policy decision-making process, from bill introduction to law

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 268 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (urging the
newly formed states to allow for diversity of representatives, other than being twenty-five
years old and a resident for seven years, to reflect the makeup of the voting base). “As it is
essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the
people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an
immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.” Id.
72
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 196 (highlighting the effects of the electorate on
representatives in Washington D.C.). Members of the executive and legislative branches are
concerned with re-election bids and support for their upcoming campaigns causing some
members to take a cautious approach to foreign relations and the judgment calls that need
to be made in this field. Id. A motivating factor for the executive branch to listen to the
legislative branch is the need to place blame on others in the hope of getting re-elected. Id.
While this sentiment may seem to be pessimistic or jaded about the political process, the fact
remains that to keep a job, the executive and legislative branches must answer to the voters.
Id.
73
See id. at 14 (distinguishing the influence of the legislative branch against having actual
control of an aspect of foreign policy). Although the executive branch might not necessarily
need the consent of the legislative branch in foreign affairs, the executive branch does need
the legislative branch’s support in other areas of legislation. See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 81
(lending support to having the legislative branch active in foreign relations).
74
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2012) (stating that the Secretary of State may determine what
material support can be given to opposing factions); see, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) (finding that the legislative branch’s reasoning for
enacting a law encompasses many aspects of the debate and that the executive or judicial
branch should consider that reasoning when making a decision).
75
See RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 154 (describing “advice and consent” as an important part
of the legislative process and a necessary check on the power of the executive branch). In
addition, the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) works to provide information and
resources to the legislative and executive branch when considering foreign relations issues.
About CRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/
[http://perma.cc/EMG9-RRZX]. The website describes the documents produced by the
CRS as reports, confidential memoranda, briefings, seminars, expert testimony, and
individual inquiries. Id.
71
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signing to oversight of the law provisions.76 In certain circumstances, the
Constitution mandated the “Advice and Consent” of the legislative
branch before the executive branch acted.77 When the Constitution or a
statute listed this requirement, the executive branch notified the
legislative branch and waited for a response either before or after taking
action.78 Ideally, the executive branch considered the report and advice of
the legislative branch, but in most cases, the legislative branch’s
instruction was non-binding and the executive branch made its own
determination.79
Traditionally, the legislative branch provided recommendations
when the executive branch negotiated with hostile countries or faced
foreign relations issues.80 For example, the legislative branch used the
open forum of Congress to provide advice to the executive branch on
providing material support to Iraq.81 Sometimes the information learned
by the legislative branch necessitated its involvement to assist the
executive branch.82

See About CRS, supra note 75 (describing the role of the CRS as “shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. CRS experts assist at every stage of
the legislative process—from the early considerations that precede bill drafting, through
committee hearings and floor debate, to the oversight of enacted laws and various agency
activities.”).
77
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the executive branch should make treaties
with the “Advice and Consent of the Senate”); see also RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 154 (requiring
the “Advice and Consent” of the legislative branch was one measure the Framers took to
make the executive branch “less king-like”).
78
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (mandating participation by the legislative branch in
treaty-making); 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2012) (directing the executive branch to notify the
legislative branch when negotiating for the release of prisoners).
79
See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 83 (separating the power of the executive branch to
conduct foreign policy from the legislative branch’s ability to influence the policies through
indirect means); Susan B. Epstein, Foreign Aid Oversight Challenges for Congress, in CONGRESS
AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 144, 156–57 (David P. Auerswald & Colton C.
Campbell eds., 2012) (noting that the legislative branch’s ability to oversee and communicate
with the executive branch about foreign relations has decreased because of the proliferation
of executive agreements); Hammond, supra note 62, at 86–87 (detailing the methods the
legislative branch can use to influence the executive branch, but reminding the reader that
the executive branch does not have to listen to the advice of the legislative branch).
80
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for legislative “Advice and Consent” in treatymaking); see, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. 12385, 12419–20 (2008) (regarding the reticence of the
executive branch to provide the legislative branch with information about on-going
negotiations with Iraq over long-term security solutions and aid).
81
See 154 CONG. REC. 24070, 24080–81 (2008–09) (imploring President Obama to utilize the
legislative branch when making executive decisions regarding Iraq).
82
See generally id. (urging the legislative branch to act according to new information and
take hold of the constitutional right to oversee decisions when the executive branch uses the
military internationally).
76
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Another way the legislative branch exerted influence over foreign
policy was through appropriations. 83 No matter the executive branch’s
goals in foreign relations, the legislative branch could control the actions
of the executive branch by granting or denying funding requests. 84 The
legislative branch may fund or defund the actions of the executive branch
through appropriations bills.85 Due to the long-standing tradition of the
executive branch being in charge of foreign relations, the legislative
branch usually was obligated to provide funding to those causes.86
Without a strong constitutional or statutory foundation for a role in
foreign relations, the legislative branch struggled to find power and
influence in foreign relations. 87 The legislative branch has been steadily
denied participation in foreign affairs, but there have been circumstances
where the executive and legislative branches worked together on foreign
relations problems.88 The question of the legislative branch’s involvement
surfaced again after the Iran Hostage Crisis in Dames & Moore v. Regan.89
83
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7 (giving the legislative branch the power to control the
release of money from the Treasury under appropriations); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 156
(stressing that the power of the purse is important as long as the legislative body decides to
use it). See generally HENKIN, supra note 29, at 74–75 (summarizing the ability of the
legislative branch to control the flow of funds for the federal government).
84
See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 74–75 (defining the parameters of the legislative branch’s
power through appropriations); RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 113 (reasoning that there is a great
need for substantial limits on the power of the executive branch, such as allowing the
legislative branch to control appropriations).
85
See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 74–75 (stating that the executive branch may veto these
appropriations bills, although this action is not very likely because the executive branch
needs some sort of funding to go through).
86
See id. at 74 (noting that the legislative branch usually feels politically or morally
obligated to fund the executive branch’s foreign relations programs); see also RAMSEY, supra
note 15, at 252–53 (providing a pro-executive branch argument that says that the legislature
“cannot regulate contrary to the President’s wishes without infringing the President’s
position as commander-in-chief”).
87
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 156 (limiting the legislative branch’s influence on
foreign relations to the power of the purse); see generally supra Part II.A.1–2 (decreasing the
legislative branch’s role in foreign policy-making through case law).
88
See 154 CONG. REC. 24070, 24080–81 (2008–09) (describing the legislative and executive
branch working together to find a solution for Iraq). The legislative and executive branches
have worked together in the past to pass major foreign policy. Oleszek & Oleszek, supra note
70, at 48. For example, the Marshall Plan and NATO were enacted during President
Truman’s presidency. Id. These actions were significant because President Truman was a
Democrat, and the Republicans controlled Congress during his presidency. Id.
89
453 U.S. 654, 665–66 (1981). During the Iran Hostage Crisis, the executive branch
negotiated with Iran, promising Iran that assets frozen by the United States Government
would be released in exchange for the release of American citizens. See RAMSEY, supra note
15, at 214 (relating the role of the legislative branch in the Iran crisis, and providing the
background of Dames & Moore). The settlement was a product of an executive agreement, so
the legislative branch did nothing to stop or restrict the executive branch. See Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 655–56 (describing the events that lead to President Carter’s issuing of executive
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Dames & Moore used the policy of non-action by the legislative branch to
infer that it indirectly supported the executive branch’s adoption of The
Algiers Accords.90 In fact, there was limited action by the legislative
branch when a committee reviewed President Carter’s negotiations, but
instead of discussing the legislative branch’s role in the negotiations, the
committee worried about whether the new statutory framework of the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act (“IEEPA”) limited the
executive branch too much.91 The legislative branch’s concern about overrestricting the executive branch led to the legislative branch backing away
from making determinations about foreign policy. 92
Opinions and advice from the legislative branch indirectly increased
its role in foreign relations, but the strong precedent set by the policies and
case law of the twentieth century led to unchecked power of the executive
branch in foreign negotiations. 93 In an attempt to restore the balance of

orders regarding Iran). In fact, Dames & Moore was “an intrusion of the President upon the
powers of the Senate,” but the legislative branch did nothing to prevent the executive branch
from engaging in the settlement. RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 215.
90
See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678–79 (determining that if the legislative branch wanted
to restrict the executive branch, they would have expressed that sentiment); SILVERSTEIN,
supra note 32, at 178 (“[T]he court found support for an executive initiative in foreign policy
not in the Constitution itself, nor in a particular act of Congress but in Congress’ lack of
action.”). Continuing the precedent of allowing the executive branch to act as the “sole
organ” of foreign relations, the legislative branch left the Supreme Court no choice but to
accept the executive agreement as binding. See id. (leading the reader to believe that the
outcome of Dames & Moore could have been different if the legislative branch stepped in and
commented on the executive branch’s actions).
91
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 154–55 (finding that President Carter attempted to
adhere to the framework of the IEEPA). IEEPA provided the executive branch with
unprecedented power to act during a national emergency. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)
(allowing the executive branch to act in certain ways when a national emergency is declared).
The nature of “national emergency” is not strictly defined, and may be under the discretion
of the executive branch. See id. (putting the need for these special powers up to the discretion
of the executive branch); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 155 (noting the ambiguity of the term
“national emergency” and the failure of the legislative branch in defining it). However, there
is a provision for the executive branch to notify the legislative branch should it choose to
enact these powers. See 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (2012) (mandating that the executive branch
“consult with Congress before exercising any of the authorities granted by this chapter and
shall consult regularly with the Congress so long as such authorities are exercised”). Instead
of limiting the amount of power exercised by the executive branch, President Carter’s
administration saw IEEPA as an opportunity to expand the power of the executive branch.
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 155 (examining the motivations for enacting IEEPA).
92
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 155 (showing a change since the ruling in CurtissWright for the legislative branch to remain hands off in the realm of foreign relations).
93
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the role the legislative branch can play in foreign affairs
through formal and informal means).
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power intended by the Constitution, the legislative branch enacted the
Case-Zablocki Act of 1972.94
B. A Diamond in the Rough: The Case-Zablocki Act of 1972
In an effort to regain some influence in foreign relations, the legislative
branch passed the Case-Zablocki Act in 1972.95 The Case-Zablocki Act
compelled the Secretary of State, as an agent of the executive branch, to
report to the legislative branch “the text of any international agreement
(including the text of any oral international agreement, which agreement
shall be reduced to writing), other than a treaty, to which the United States
is a party as soon as practicable after such agreement has entered into
force[.]”96 The history of executive interaction with foreign entities
continued to evolve and change, prompting the legislative branch to
expand the definition of international executive agreements. 97 While the

94
See supra Part II.A.3 (exemplifying the precedent since Curtiss-Wright of the legislative
branch having a decreased role in foreign relations).
95
See Spitzer, supra note 28, at 96 (introducing the Case-Zablocki Act). The Case-Zablocki
Act grew out of legislative branch frustration from not being informed about various
executive negotiations and agreements in the 1960s, specifically with Ethiopia, Laos,
Thailand, and Korea. Id. Senator Case, when introducing this bill in the Senate, expressed
concern that in the ever-changing situation overseas with troop deployments and foreign
relations, legislative involvement in foreign agreements was needed more than ever. 116
CONG. REC. 39556 (1970) [hereinafter Senator Case’s Remarks] (statement of Sen. Case). The
Case-Zablocki Act states:
The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any
international agreement (including the text of any oral international
agreement, which agreement shall be reduced to writing), other than a
treaty, to which the United States is a party as soon as practicable after
such agreement has entered into force with respect to the United States
but in no event later than sixty days thereafter. However, any such
agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the
opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the
United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be
transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives
under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due
notice from the President. Any department or agency of the United
States Government which enters into any international agreement on
behalf of the United States shall transmit to the Department of State the
text of such agreement not later than twenty days after such agreement
has been signed.
1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (2012).
96
1 U.S.C. § 112b(a); see also Spitzer, supra note 28, at 96 (stating that the Secretary of State
must give information about international agreements to the legislative branch).
97
See supra Part II.A–B (revealing the constant evolution of the nature of agreements and
negotiations with other countries). See, e.g., Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress:
Hearing on S.596 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong. 13 (1971) (statement of
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Constitution only mandated that the executive branch notify the
legislative branch when entering into a treaty, the Case-Zablocki Act
expanded the requirement to include any international agreement. 98
Additionally, the Case-Zablocki Act provided a timeline for action,
ordering the executive branch to notify the legislative branch “as soon as
practicable after such agreement has entered into force.” 99 Furthermore,
the Case-Zablocki Act provided a statutory means for the legislative
branch to be notified about international agreements made by the
executive branch.100
Although the Case-Zablocki Act increased the legislative branch’s
ability to oversee the executive branch, problems arose in the actual
implementation and use of the statute.101 The first problem was the vague
wording, especially the definition of “international agreement” and what
constitutes the “text” of an oral agreement. 102 The second problem with

Sen. McGee, member S. Comm. of Foreign Affairs) (advocating for a change in the status quo
of foreign relations). Senator McGee states:
The consequences of the advent of a bipolar world, of the nuclear age,
of a diminishing of space itself around the world and the consequences
of World War II—all of these things have suddenly brought into focus
historical responsibilities and decision-making requirements that
probably did not always plague our forebears in the business.
Id.
98
Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the executive branch must make treaties
with “the Advice and Consent of the Senate”), with 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (ordering the executive
branch to relay information about the agreement after the negotiations and agreement with
the other country occurred).
99
1 U.S.C. § 112b(a).
100
See Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The Case-Zablocki Act
is evidently meant to mediate between the foreign relations powers of Congress and the
President.”). See generally 1 U.S.C. § 112b (outlining the steps that must be taken by the
executive branch to ensure proper notification of the legislative branch).
101
See Spitzer, supra note 28, at 97 (estimating that from 1972–75 “presidents had entered
into from 400 to 600 understandings with other governments that had not been reported to
Congress”). The problem of non-compliance continued to occur throughout the 1970s. Id.
102
See Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress: Hearing on S.596 Before the S. Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong. 14 (1971) [hereinafter Professor Bartlett’s Remarks]
(statement of Professor Ruhl J. Bartlett, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University) (attempting to decide what kinds of international agreements should be
regulated to the legislative branch). Professor Bartlett defined international agreements as:
[A]n international agreement has been called an international compact
and it is an agreement between one nation and another or between one
head of a state and another . . . in international law the international
lawyer would consider executive agreements to be those that are
believed by governments to bind their countries.
Id. See generally Letter to Congress on Case-Zablocki Act 3-6-1997, 1997 WL 100962
(portraying the transmission of a report from President Clinton to the Speaker of the House
in compliance with Case-Zablocki, but also revealing the relative generality of the report);
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the Case-Zablocki Act was the enforcement because there were not
substantial means for the legislative body to rely on if the executive branch
did not comply with the statute.103 The Case-Zablocki Act had been in
effect since 1972, yet the legislative branch rarely relied on the Act to force
the executive branch into active notification. 104 The problem remains the
same today, but the Case-Zablocki Act outlines the method in which the
legislative branch can regain power in foreign relations.105
C. The Evolution of the Material Support Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
The legislative branch enacted the material support statute as an
extension of the Constitution’s foreign relations precedents, CurtissWright, and the current operations of the legislative branch.106 Part II.C.1
discusses the creation and reasoning of the material support statute under
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).107
Then, Part II.C.2 explores revisions made to the material support statute
under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(“IRTPA”) and the statute in place today.108
1.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

In 1996, after facing multiple threats from FTOs, the legislative branch
passed and signed the AEDPA to identify and provide a statutory

RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 216 (stating that neither branch has the full power of the
government when entering international agreements).
103
See 1 U.S.C. § 112b (containing no methods of enforcement or punishment if the
executive branch does not comply with the Act). See also Spitzer, supra note 28, at 97
(outlining other ways the legislative branch might be able to force compliance). To gently
persuade the executive branch to comply with the Case-Zablocki Act, the legislative branch
could refuse funding, or “threaten public disclosure of controversial secret agreements.” Id.
104
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2012) (lacking any mention of reporting the release of
material support to the legislative branch in compliance with the Case-Zablocki Act).
Throughout all the literature considered for this Note, the Case-Zablocki only gets
mentioned in one book (this is of course, exempting the Congressional Record and
Committee Hearings).
105
See infra Part III.D.1 (combining the Case-Zablocki Act with the material support
statute).
106
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (exhibiting the current wording of the material support statute);
supra Part II.A.1–3 (describing the evolution of the roles of the executive and legislative
branches in foreign relations).
107
See infra Part II.C.1 (elaborating on the AEDPA’s effect on foreign relations).
108
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the changes made to the material support statute by the
IRTPA and the use of those changes today).
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framework for how to deal with emerging FTOs.109 Through this Act, the
legislative branch gave the executive branch the power to identify certain
groups as FTOs.110 The AEDPA defined a FTO as a group that “engages
in terrorist activity . . . or retains the capability and intent to engage in
terrorist activity or terrorism and . . . the terrorist activity or terrorism of
the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the
national security of the United States.”111 Under the AEDPA, the Secretary
of State identified these groups, which prevented citizens from providing

109
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 301, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (engaging new prohibitions against supporting FTOs). See also RAPHAEL PERL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB95112, TERRORISM, THE FUTURE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 5 (2003)
(signaling a shift in policy regarding punishing and deterring individual FTOs rather than
focusing on state sponsors). The trend of terrorism has expanded from state sponsors of
terrorism to smaller groups that are more mobile, have independent financing, and have safe
havens throughout the world. See id. (exploring the impact of a changing environment in
terrorism).
110
See AEDPA § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (1996) (providing the guidelines for designating a
group as a FTO). Under the AEDPA, the Secretary of State determined which groups are
designated FTOs. See id. (designating the Secretary of State as the executive branch’s agent).
See also DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 137 (2006)
(naming the Secretary of State as the person determining the status of a suspected FTO). The
courts are not always able to review the Secretary’s determination because the Secretary’s
decision may be based on classified information. See id. at 139 (determining that the role of
the judiciary in checking the FTO determinations of the executive branch are extremely
limited). Over a year after the implementation of the AEDPA, the executive branch
designated thirty groups as FTOs. See id. at 163 (stating that the list of thirty FTOs were only
released after pressure from political groups). After the implementation of the AEDPA, the
State Department released the list of FTOs that an individual could be prosecuted if material
support was provided. See id. (describing the reasoning for releasing the list of FTOs). These
groups included: Abu Nidal Organization, Abu Sayyaf Group, Aum Supreme Truth, Basque
Fatherland and Liberty, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, al-Gama’at alIslamiyya, HAMAS, The Harakat ul-Ansar, Hizballah, Japanese Red Army, al-Jihad, Kach
and Kahane Chai, Kurdistan Workers’ Party, The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Manuel
Rodriguez Patriotic Front, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, National Liberation Army, The
Palestine Islamic Jihad, Palestine Liberation Front, The Party of Democratic Kampuchea,
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Revolutionary Organization
17 November, Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front, Revolutionary People’s
Struggle, Sendero Luminoso, and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. Patterns of Global
Terrorism: 1997 Appendix B Background Information on Terrorist Groups, STATE DEP’T,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/backg.html [http://perma.
cc/TGN6-NMF2]. The FTO designation is good for two years, and must be renewed by the
Secretary of State to remain valid. HOWARD BALL, THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001:
BALANCING CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 167 (2004).
111
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2012).
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material support to the groups because the materials may be used to
support terrorism ends.112
Subsequently, the enactment of the AEDPA solidified the exclusion of
the legislative branch from foreign relations. 113 Not only did the executive
branch designate groups as FTOs, but when it exercised that power, the
legislative branch had no substantial ability to refute or support the
designation except through enacting new legislation. 114 The legislative
branch retained minimal influence through advice and opinion, but only
if the executive branch specifically sought out this information.115 The
AEDPA permitted the executive branch to disregard legislative branch
information and do what it thought was best for the safety and security of
the nation.116
The executive branch held exclusive control over this facet of the
AEDPA, which did not require legislative oversight. 117 However, the
executive branch had to notify legislative branch leaders of the intent to
designate a new FTO because the statute only required notice and not

112
See AEDPA § 301(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (prohibiting anyone from providing material
support to listed FTOs). “The purpose of this subtitle is to provide the Federal Government
the fullest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution, to prevent persons within the
United States, or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material
support or resources to foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities.” Id. Granting
the executive branch power to limit support for terrorist organizations can be traced back to
the Reagan era when the Reagan administration sent Congress a bill criminalizing
supporting terrorist organizations. See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 110, at 127 (noting the
similarities between the AEDPA and the proposed legislation during the Reagan era).
Congress rejected the bill for constitutional concerns. Id. The Bush administration also tried
to obtain power to limit support for terrorist organizations, but Congress again rejected the
proposal. Id. Finally, under the Clinton administration, additional amendments helped to
pass the provision, which became the AEDPA. Id.
113
See generally AEDPA § 302 (shifting the focus to the executive branch’s power to
designate groups as FTOs when the need arises).
114
See id. (stating that if the legislative branch does not agree with the executive branch’s
designation of a FTO, the designation may be repealed through “an Act of Congress”). Also,
within thirty days of the executive branch’s designation, the group designated as a FTO may
appeal to the judiciary for a ruling. Id.
115
See id. (determining the parameters for legislative involvement in designating FTOs);
see also Part II.A.3 (reiterating the importance of allowing the legislative body to comment on
actions taken by the executive branch, but reminding that the executive branch can still act
how they want according to existing statutes and the Constitution).
116
See AEDPA § 302 (allowing the executive branch to make the designation of whether a
group should be classified as a FTO).
117
See id. (giving the executive branch control over designations of FTOs). At the time of
publication, there is proposed legislation to amend this statute. H.R. 5348, 113th Cong.
(2014). The amendment would allow the legislative branch to oversee the designations by
the executive branch. Id. Specifically, the executive branch would have 120 days to report
to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Id.
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oversight.118 The legislative branch could reverse a FTO designation after
the executive branch made a determination and published the findings in
the Federal Register, but the legislative branch had no other means of
oversight in the designation of a FTO. 119
Once the executive branch designated a group as a FTO, citizens could
not provide material support to these groups. 120 The AEDPA defined
material support as “currency or other financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious materials.”121 Individual citizens
providing this type of support faced prison and fines as penalties.122 The
executive branch’s responsibilities included: recommending updates to
the definitions of the statute, designating the FTOs, and enforcing the
statute through the court system.123 However, the AEDPA did not give
the executive branch direct authority to release material support and the
statute remained silent on the issue until the enactment of IRTPA. 124
2.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

In an effort to broaden the role of the executive branch in foreign
relations, specifically with terrorism, the IRTPA grew out of the PATRIOT
Act of 2001 and gave the executive branch authority to release material

118
See AEDPA § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i) (requiring the Secretary of State to notify
congressional leaders in a classified message the intent to designate and the factual basis for
the designation, but the congressional leaders cannot reject the designation at this point).
119
See id. § 1189(a)(5) (guiding the process for the legislative branch to repeal a designation
made by the executive branch).
120
See AEDPA § 323, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1996) (building off of the statute allowing the
executive branch to designate a FTO by prohibiting individuals from providing material
support to those groups); see also Steven W. Becker, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . .”: Assessing
the Aftermath of September 11th, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 608–09 (2003) (explaining the impact
of the Secretary of State’s designation of a FTO on people peripherally affiliated with the
group).
121
AEDPA § 323, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
122
See id. (defining the possible punishment as “fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both”).
123
See AEDPA § 303, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (1996) (outlining the specific roles of the executive
branch in designating FTOs and releasing material support).
124
See id. (noting the lack of what will become later subsection (j) of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B);
supra Part II.C.2 (discussing IRTPA as an outgrowth of AEDPA, particularly with more focus
and expanded role for the executive branch in the release of material support).
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support.125 The IRTPA extended and clarified portions of the AEDPA,
while continuing to exclude the legislative branch from participating in
foreign relations and the release of material support. 126 The amended
statute did not mention a role for the legislative branch, nor had the
legislative branch considered notification of the material support released
by the executive branch.127 The culmination of years of pushing the
legislative branch out of foreign relations led to the executive branch’s
control of U.S. foreign policy.128
The IRTPA added an exception to the original material support statute
from the AEDPA to allow the Secretary of State, with the Attorney
General’s approval, to release material support should the occasion
arise.129 The inclusion of subsection (j) to the already existing statute
125
See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638 (expanding the statutory language of AEDPA). See also STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
RETHINKING THE PATRIOT ACT: KEEPING AMERICA SAFE AND FREE 5 (2005) (stating that the
IRTPA wanted to reorganize the intelligence community and modify parts of the PATRIOT
Act that did not get to be completely vetted before voting). Although IRTPA gave broader
power to the executive branch, no transparency accompanied the increased responsibility.
See id. at 6 (losing accountability endangers the decision-making process). IRTPA clarifies
definitions of services and training found in AEDPA. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 110, at
165. The wording of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A changed to include:
(2) in subsection (b)—
(A) by striking “or other financial securities” and inserting “or monetary
instruments or financial securities”; and
(B) by inserting “expert advice or assistance,” after “training,”
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(a)(2)(A)–(B). See also COLE & DEMPSEY,
supra note 110, at 195–96 (explaining how, after September 11, 2001, the legislative branch all
but gave up any rights to oversee the actions of the executive branch). The executive branch,
through the actions of the Attorney General, pushed through the PATRIOT Act to gain broad
power in the realm of foreign relations and national security. See id. at 196 (noting that due
to the sheer length of the PATRIOT Act and the quickness of the vote meant that the
legislators could not have read and understood all provisions in the bill).
126
Compare AEDPA § 303, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g) (stopping with subsection (g) and failing to
note the executive branch’s role in the release of material support), with IRTPA § 6603, 18
U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2004) (permitting the executive branch to release material support when
the situation demands it).
127
See IRTPA § 6603 (designating the executive branch as the entity to release material
support).
128
See supra Part II.A–B (showing the evolution of the executive and legislative branches
in foreign relations).
129
See IRTPA § 6603 (giving the executive branch power to release material support). The
direct wording of the statute is:
No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the
term “personnel”, “training”, or “expert advice or assistance” if the
provision of that material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization was approved by the Secretary of State with the
concurrence of the Attorney General. The Secretary of State may not
approve the provision of any material support that may be used to carry
out terrorist activity.
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authorized the executive branch to continue conducting negotiations with
foreign entities, while maintaining secrecy and speed. 130 Through the
inclusion of this new subsection (j), IRTPA expanded the divide between
the executive and legislative branches in foreign relations and defied the
mandate of the Case-Zablocki Act.131
Broadening the power of the executive branch in the release of
material support to FTOs naturally arose out of the environment after
September 11, 2001, specifically allowing the executive branch to act
unilaterally, without legislative oversight or notification. 132 The years
after September 11 were deemed a time of national emergency, which
caused the legislative branch to statutorily expand the executive branch’s
power over foreign policy.133 Currently under the material support
statute, the legislative branch cannot compel the executive branch to
notify the legislative branch in a prompt manner. 134 The current version
of the Case-Zablocki Act directs the executive branch to alert the
legislative branch to any international agreements, and remedies the lack
of guidance in the material support statute. 135
III. ANALYSIS
The material support statute coupled with the Case-Zablocki Act
reasserts the power of notification and the influence of the legislative
branch in foreign relations.136 The legislative branch’s role in foreign
relations, while stifled from years of the executive branch imposing its
will, exists and should be included in the release of material support and

Id.
130
See id. (including the new part giving the executive branch the power to release material
support directly excludes the legislative branch from the negotiation process); see also New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the importance of conducting international diplomacy with secrecy and
speed).
131
See supra Part II.B–C (discussing the relationship between the Case-Zablocki Act and
the material support statute).
132
See IRTPA § 6603, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2004) (neglecting to mention the legislative
branch’s role in providing material support); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2012) (mentioning
explicitly the Secretary of State and the ability to release material support to FTOs).
133
See BALL, supra note 110, at 37 (enabling the executive branch to hunt and destroy
terrorist organizations right after September 11, 2001).
134
See supra Part II.B–C (noting the lack of guidance in the material support statute and
suggesting the implementation of the Case-Zablocki Act procedures into it).
135
See infra Part III.D.2 (advocating for the combination of the material support statute with
the Case-Zablocki Act).
136
See infra Part III.D (increasing the role of the legislative branch by incorporating the
Case-Zablocki Act into the material support statute).
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negotiations with FTOs.137 Including the legislative branch in foreign
negotiations with FTOs does not diminish the executive branch’s power
to act as the nation’s representative in foreign affairs.138 The Case-Zablocki
Act presents a starting point for including the legislative branch in the
relatively new field of negotiations with FTOs and extends a statute that
is not always followed.139
To show that the material support statute should be amended to
include the legislative branch in negotiations with FTOs, Part III.A
evaluates the inherent checks and balances problems in foreign relations
and advocates for legislative involvement in a traditional realm of
executive branch influence.140 Then, Part III.B examines why the CaseZablocki Act should be the beginning step for the legislative branch to
regain leverage in foreign relations.141 Part III.C analyzes the problems
with the existing material support statute.142 Finally, Part III.D argues for
the combination of the material support statute and the Case-Zablocki Act
as the best solution to increase the legislative branch’s role in negotiations
with FTOs and foreign relations in general.143
A. Re-evaluating Current Problems with Checks and Balances
Increasing the legislative branch’s role in foreign relations requires an
in-depth look at its history and an analysis of why the stigmas remain
enforced today.144 For example, a brief reading of the Constitution shows
that the executive branch should negotiate with foreign entities and the
legislative branch should legislate. 145 However, a closer reading of the
Constitution reveals that the legislative branch may hold foreign relations
137
See supra Part II.A–C (relating the evolution of the legislative branch’s role in foreign
relations, stretching from the Constitution to the dominant case law of Curtiss-Wright and
through the enactment of the Case-Zablocki Act).
138
See infra Part III.A (interpreting the role of the legislative branch in the Constitution).
139
See infra Part III.B (explaining the role of the Case-Zablocki Act in negotiations with
FTOs).
140
See infra Part III.A (expanding upon the scarcity of the legislative branch’s role in foreign
relations).
141
See infra Part III.B (advocating for the expansion of the Case-Zablocki Act into
negotiations with FTOs).
142
See infra Part III.C (discussing the shortcomings of the current material support statute,
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012)).
143
See infra Part III.D (determining that amending the material support statute is the best
way to involve the legislative branch in negotiations with FTOs).
144
See Ornstein, supra note 22, at 64 (examining the history and determining that the
framework for the legislative branch’s involvement in foreign relations is fractured).
145
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (regulating legislative power to the legislative branch);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving the legislative branch the power to make laws); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1 (outlining the duties of the executive branch). See generally Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (using the Constitution to justify the
executive branch’s claim to be the representative in foreign relations).
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powers that are not as blatant as those of the executive branch. 146 The
ability of the legislative branch to provide “Advice and Consent” to major
pieces of foreign relations directly involves the legislative branch in a field
predominantly occupied by the executive branch. 147 This allowance
coupled with the ability of the legislative branch to create laws, implies
that the Constitution inherently allows the legislative branch to be
involved in foreign relations.148
The Constitution leaves room for the legislative branch in foreign
relations because the Constitution’s ambiguities about the roles of the
executive and legislative branches create room for interpretation. 149 The
constitutional clauses do not directly outline how the executive branch
obtains “Advice and Consent” from the legislative branch during treaty
formation, nor does the Constitution specifically spell out the procedures
for conducting international agreements other than treaties. 150 These
ambiguities indicate that lawmakers and scholars should rely on
reasonable interpretations to determine which branch of the government
should be involved.151 Having a Constitution that can be debated and

146
See generally Spitzer, supra note 28, at 85–86 (discussing the roles of the legislative and
executive branches in foreign relations, specifically that the Constitution does not enumerate
roles for either branch in foreign relations, except for formal treaty-making).
147
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving the legislative branch the power to make laws
necessary for the continuing function of the federal government); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2 (reserving the power of “Advice and Consent” to the legislative branch). See also
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (exploring how the powers of the executive and legislative
branches under the Constitution, while not completely defined, obtain definition from the
separation of powers in the framework of the Constitution). To enhance the framework of
the Constitution, the totality of the circumstances, including the present situation, the history
of interaction between the branches, and any definitions provided by the Constitution must
be considered. Id.
148
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the legislative branch power to influence the
executive branch through the “Advice and Consent” clause); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18 (providing the legislative branch with the power to create laws).
149
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (comparing
the words of the Constitution to the Federalist Papers to show that the constitutional clauses
sometimes contradict each other, but the Federalist Papers help give perspective on the
enumerated and non-enumerated powers); see also RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 28 (stating that
the Constitution should not be looked at in isolation, but combined with the history and
contemporary issues to gain a true understanding and meaningful interpretation).
150
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (enumerating the procedure for entering into formal
treaties); Spitzer, supra note 28, at 85–86 (noticing that the executive branch’s foreign relations
powers are much more direct in the Constitution, and the legislative branch’s effect on those
powers is not as clear); see also RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 130 (cautioning that scholars should
not “overstate the Constitution’s executive foreign affairs powers”).
151
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 12 (revealing that the founders created the government
with different branches to not only separate the powers, but to help the government keep
itself in line with the Constitution through competition and debate).
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redefined without changing the underlying intent and meaning
empowers legislators to meet new foreign relations challenges. 152
The seemingly firm, yet flexible framework of the Constitution
permits the executive and legislative branches to meet new challenges in
the field of foreign relations.153 Even though the Constitution regulated
foreign negotiations to the executive branch, the intent of the Framers to
include the legislative branch cannot be ignored.154 The Constitution
separated the branches of the government to spread power to all three
branches and ensure effective governance through checks and balances
because without flexibility, the Constitution would not remain a
contemporary source of law.155 Including the legislative branch in
negotiations with FTOs hearkens back to the Framers’ original intent to
have the legislative and executive branches work together to find
solutions to foreign relations problems. 156
As an extension of early constitutional interpretations, Justice
Sutherland’s “sole organ” doctrine in Curtiss-Wright kept the legislative
branch out of foreign relations.157 The holding in Curtiss-Wright effectively
eliminated the opportunity for the legislative branch to participate in
152
See, e.g., id. (stressing the importance of compromise and debate between the branches
of government to act in the best interest of the country, especially when meeting the new
challenges in foreign relations in the 1970s).
153
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 596 (1952) (explaining that
since the Constitution was written for an unknown future, a reading of the document should
be both spacious to accommodate the new circumstances and narrow enough to avoid
abuse). See also Ornstein, supra note 22, at 62 (relating the expanded parameters of the
Constitution to the relationship between the branches). Ornstein notes that the Framers:
[A]ttempt[ed] to provide the executive with some leeway in carrying
out military action and maintaining international intercourse and
diplomatic relations . . . But they made certain that foreign policy would
be well grounded in a popular foundation through the elaborate set of
checks and balances built into the war power, the treaty power, and the
other authority they designated.
Id. Although at times the pendulum between the branches has moved back and forth
depending on the circumstances, the Framers’ foundation held firm and continues to assist
the government in meeting new challenges. Id.
154
See Ornstein, supra note 22, at 38–39 (involving the legislative branch in foreign relations
was an original intent of the Framers until later in the debate and negotiations).
155
See generally Adler, supra note 47, at 20 (“[T]he overwhelming preference of both the
Framers at the Constitutional Convention and the ratifiers in the various state conventions
for collective decision making in foreign as well as domestic affairs and, second, their equally
adamant opposition to unilateral executive control of U.S. foreign policy.”).
156
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 36, at 438 (supporting a collaborative relationship
between the executive and legislative branches). A reexamination of the Constitution shows
that the legislative branch should not usurp the power of the executive branch, but should
assist the executive branch in foreign relations. Id.
157
See RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 14 (finding that proponents of a strong executive branch
and of Curtiss-Wright, not surprisingly, tend to be members of the executive branch).
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foreign relations.158 The small gains from a liberal reading of the
Constitution faded away and a ban on the involvement of the legislative
branch in foreign relations began.159 Justice Sutherland’s naming the
executive branch the “sole organ” of foreign relations created the
impression of an all-powerful, never yielding executive branch.160 This
opinion entered into mainstream American politics during the Cold War,
when many voters advocated for a stronger, centralized government to
meet the threat of the Soviet Union. 161 By perpetuating Justice
Sutherland’s “sole organ” doctrine, the executive and legislative branches
separated themselves further and made collaboration on foreign relations
a difficult road.
Justice Sutherland’s misinterpretation of the Constitution in CurtissWright continued to harm United States’ foreign policy throughout the
twentieth century.162 Relied upon by proponents of a strong executive
branch, the policy misconstrues the attempts of the Constitution to
maintain a government based on checks and balances and puts all of the
power of foreign relations on the executive branch. 163 Not only did the
“sole organ” doctrine separate the powers too far, but it also did not
produce concrete guidance for the executive branch on how to approach
new problems in foreign relations.164 The lack of direction meant that the

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (holding that the
executive branch is the best part of the government to deal with foreign relations because the
legislative branch is too fragmented and works too slowly for most diplomatic issues).
159
See Adler, supra note 47, at 26 (examining the effect of Curtiss-Wright on foreign
relations). Sometimes, Justice Sutherland’s “sole organ” doctrine is dismissed as dicta, but
when there are new questions regarding executive or legislative power in foreign relations,
the doctrine finds a way to be included. Id. “[T]he ghost of Curtiss-Wright has been made to
walk again. Even the most cursory review of the cases in which it has been invoked makes
clear that the essence of this ‘spirit’ is great ‘deference to executive judgment in this vast
external realm’ of foreign relations.” Id.
160
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20 (expanding the executive branch’s foreign
relations power to answer only to the Constitution); Newsom, supra note 21, at 102 (justifying
minimizing the legislative branch’s involvement in foreign relations to increase the executive
branch’s power).
161
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 41 (revealing that Justice Sutherland hoped to create a
strong, centralized government equipped to meet threats from abroad).
162
See generally Adler, supra note 47, at 45 (noting the profound effect of Curtiss-Wright on
foreign relations law); Koh, supra note 59, at 159–60 (stating the effects of Curtiss-Wright’s
holding on the work of scholars throughout the twentieth century).
163
See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 41 (relying on the flawed reasoning of Curtiss-Wright
continued throughout the twentieth century, neglecting to realize that foreign affairs powers
are intertwined between the branches of government).
164
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (guiding the executive branch by saying that foreign
policy should be conducted with caution and secrecy). Additionally, the executive branch
should weigh the needs of the nation when determining how to negotiate with foreign
entities. Id.
158
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executive branch would also have wide discretion on how to conduct the
foreign relations, without any help from the legislative or judicial
branches.165 The holding in Curtiss-Wright upset the balance of powers
intended by the Constitution’s Framers and created a misguided and
unworkable precedent in foreign relations, leading to the marginalization
of the legislative branch for many years.166
B. Regaining Influence and Keeping an Eye on the Executive Branch in Foreign
Relations
In an effort to regain influence lost under Curtiss-Wright, the
legislative branch has had to find other ways to persuade the executive
branch in foreign relations.167 By obtaining the power of oversight in
specific instances, the ability to publicly comment, and control
appropriations for any executive branch suggested program, the
legislative branch earned back some influence in foreign relations. 168 At
first glance, these options for the legislative branch satisfy the ideals of the
Constitution and help the legislative branch keep the executive branch in
check; however, this is not the case.169 If the legislative branch relies on
public comment or appealing to the voters, the executive branch is not
necessarily bound to the suggestions of the legislative branch. 170 The best
way the legislative branch can influence the executive branch’s decision
making is through the control of appropriations. 171 The Constitution does
not grant the executive branch power to control spending, so the
legislative branch can use this enumerated power to directly impose its
will on foreign policy.172 Even this option, mandated by the Constitution,
does not always influence the executive branch because of the “sole
organ” doctrine and legislators’ hesitation to bar the passage of

165
See id. at 319 (giving the executive branch wide deference in foreign relations and the
other branches should automatically defer to those decisions).
166
See supra Part III.A (explaining the mess of the Curtiss-Wright holding and how it
directly refutes the Framers’ intent of the Constitution).
167
See supra Part II.A.3 (outlining the existing ways the legislative branch can influence the
executive branch).
168
See supra Part II.A.3 (expanding upon the means of influence).
169
See Hammond, supra note 62, at 84 (noting that legislative involvement is “an open
process, with numerous opportunities for access by the executive and the public, and for
changed decisions all along the route. There is also potential for delay and obstruction.”).
170
See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 81 (portraying legislative branch resolutions as important
in the foreign relations process, but not binding upon the decisions of the executive branch).
171
See id. (declaring that the legislative branch, while having little power to bind the
executive branch in foreign relations outside of legislation, can “exercise tremendous
influence even on such policy” through appropriations).
172
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (allowing the legislative branch to control the allocation
of money to various parts of the federal government).
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appropriations.173 The legislative branch’s lack of direction in foreign
relations allows the executive branch to carry out important policy
The
without input from other branches of the government. 174
apprehension of legislators to restrict executive branch decisions, using
specifically enumerated powers, shows that the legislative branch has
been pushed out of foreign relations for so long that they are afraid to
assert any checks upon the executive branch in foreign policy.
Another way the legislative branch tried to gain back foreign relations
influence after the spread of the Curtiss-Wright holding was through the
enactment of the Case-Zablocki Act.175 The legislative branch reexamined
definitions and enforcement of the Case-Zablocki Act to reassert authority
in foreign relations because it provided an important check on the power
of the executive branch.176 The Case-Zablocki Act took the small, specific
instances of oversight and made a statute demanding notification of any
international agreement.177 Moving from Curtiss-Wright’s declaration that
the executive branch was the “sole organ” to requiring notification of
executive agreements was an unprecedented step for the legislature to
take in foreign relations. 178 Passing the Case-Zablocki Act gave the
legislative branch a significant role in foreign relations because the
legislative branch had statutory means to oversee actions of the executive
branch outside of appropriations and informal means. 179
Although the Case-Zablocki Act increased the legislative branch’s
participation in foreign relations, there are problems with it. 180 For
173
See generally HENKIN, supra note 29, at 74–75 (describing the reasons why withholding
appropriations may not directly influence the executive branch when making foreign policy
decisions).
174
See supra Part II.A.1 (outlining the Constitution and the interpretation of the executive
branch’s powers in foreign relations); see also RAMSEY, supra note 15, at 201 (determining that
executive powers in foreign relations do not need to be enumerated to be enforced under
Article II, section 1); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2012) (designating the executive branch as
the sole branch to release material support without providing oversight opportunities for
other branches).
175
See generally Spitzer, supra note 28, at 96 (providing a general history and explanation
of the Case-Zablocki Act).
176
See 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2012) (forcing the executive branch to report any international
agreements to the legislative branch, thus allowing the legislative branch oversight in foreign
policy decisions).
177
See Spitzer, supra note 28, at 96 (remarking that the legislative branch was tired of being
left out of important international agreements that affected the entire nation).
178
See Senator Case’s Remarks, supra note 95 (noting the non-involvement of the legislative
branch in foreign relations before the introduction of the bill); see also Spitzer, supra note 28,
at 107 (attempting to adapt to a changing foreign relations environment by passing
legislation including the legislative branch in the predominately executive branch realm).
179
See generally 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (increasing the legislative branch’s role in foreign
relations by requiring the executive branch to report any international agreements).
180
See id. (providing the language of the Case-Zablocki Act).
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example, the Case-Zablocki Act does not define “international agreement”
or what and how the executive branch needs to report to the legislative
branch.181 Moreover, defining “international agreement” leaves the
nature of the agreement up to the discretion of the executive branch, thus
giving the executive branch discretion on whether to notify the legislative
branch.182 Additionally, the executive branch does not have to report
negotiations or the release of material support to FTOs. 183 Thus, the
absence of a solid definition of what types of international agreements are
covered under this statute makes enforcement difficult.184
On the other hand, the ambiguity of the definition of “international
agreement” assists the legislative branch because the legislative branch
could say that a specific agreement fits the broad definition and should be
reported. The broad definition could include the material support statute
regarding negotiations and the release of material support to FTOs. 185 The
Case-Zablocki Act is a valuable tool for the legislative branch to impact
the foreign policies of the executive branch and give meaningful oversight
to a usually secretive process of negotiating and providing material
support to FTOs.
C. The Material Support Statute: Still Leaving the Legislative Branch Out in
the Cold
Despite the influence gained through appropriations and the CaseZablocki Act, the introduction of the AEDPA continued the practices of
the twentieth century by excluding the legislative branch from foreign
relations, particularly when dealing with FTOs. 186 When the material
support statutes were enacted as a part of the AEDPA, the focus on
punishing nations who sponsor FTOs shifted to the prosecution of

181
See id. (defining international agreement as a writing or oral agreement entered into
with a foreign entity by the executive branch); Professor Bartlett’s Remarks, supra note 102,
at 14 (defining international agreement as “an agreement between one nation and another or
between one head of a state and another” and with each country having an intent to bind
their respective countries).
182
See Spitzer, supra note 28, at 96 (“The act did not define executive agreements, and thus
presidents have applied their own definitions, which have excluded understandings that
many members of Congress believed were agreements.”).
183
See infra Part III.D (combining the Case-Zablocki Act with the specific negotiations for
the release of material support).
184
See, e.g., Spitzer, supra note 28, at 96–97 (describing when President Nixon negotiated
with South Vietnam for full engagement, but did not inform Congress, who then became
angry at the non-disclosure and refused to uphold the United States’ end of the bargain).
185
See Professor Bartlett’s Remarks, supra note 102, at 14 (establishing a broad definition
for international agreement as an agreement between two international nations).
186
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the enactment of the AEDPA).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2015], Art. 9

356

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

individuals who provided material support. 187 This change in focus
indicates that the United States Government recognizes that restricting
funds and supplies to the FTOs limits crimes and atrocities.188 The
government’s recognition of the importance of material support and its
effect on FTOs shows that the material support statute is the most
established and comprehensive statute available regarding negotiations
with FTOs.
The material support statute contributes basic definitions of FTOs and
material support, thus providing a beginning outline for congressional
notification of an ever-changing situation in foreign relations. 189 For
example, the statute includes a definition of what items constitute material
support.190 While there are some specifics, the material support statute
uses broad terms like “currency” or “transportation” to leave room for the
branches to determine needs in a changing situation. 191 The statute also
outlines procedures on how to designate a group as a FTO without
limiting the executive branch.192 By amending the statute already
containing these two critical definitions, there would be little reason for
the legislative branch to modify definitions that already work in foreign

See PERL, supra note 109, at 5 (engaging state sponsors of terrorism through the military
or diplomatically until the passage of the AEDPA, whereas before, the focus was on
punishment). The problem came when the FTOs became more trans-national and integrated
into civilian populations. Id. at 4. To meet these new problems, Congress enacted the
AEDPA with the intent of targeting individual sponsors of FTOs and attempting to cut off
all resources from these groups. Id. at 5.
188
See id. (emphasizing the fact that if the government limits supplies to FTOs, then the
international community should band together and sanction the FTOs).
189
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2012) (defining material support as property in various forms
that is given from individuals or groups to FTOs on the executive branch’s list).
190
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (providing a definition for material support). The
statute specifically defines material support as:
[T]he term “material support or resources” means any property,
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious
materials.
Id.
191
See id. (defining what constitutes material support).
192
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012) (outlining the method to designate a particular group
as a FTO).
187
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relations.193 Amending the already existing material support statute
promotes continuity in foreign relations, where the United States must
maintain a strong, unified front.194
Enacting IRTPA expanded the material support statute and continued
the practice of prohibiting the legislative branch from directly
participating in foreign policy. 195 The material support statute, after
revision and consideration by various lawmakers, still does not
specifically define the foreign policy roles of the executive and legislative
branches.196 The bulk of the statute addresses prohibitions on private
citizens to give material support to FTOs, but subsection (j) permits the
executive branch to release material support to FTOs. 197 The subsection (j)
exception does not mention a role for the legislative branch.198 The
material support statute outlines what private citizens may or may not
furnish to FTOs, but this statute does not allow for congressional
notification if the government releases material support to a FTO. 199 A
statute without a firm role for the legislative branch gives the executive
branch unchecked power during negotiations with FTOs. 200
193
See A Review of the Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Improvements Act, 109th Cong.
10 (2005) (statement of Daniel Meron, Principle Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen., Civil Division)
(“[T]he language that was added in the amendments makes the language sufficiently specific
and clear. It is clearly constitutional on its face, and the courts remain ready to consider any
challenge . . . .”).
194
See generally Moore, supra note 51, at 954–55 (advocating primarily for a non-unified
voice to government, but realizing that some particular aspects of foreign policy require the
government to speak with one voice). Participation of other branches of the government
may help increase the strength of negotiations and a mutually satisfactory agreement can be
reached. Id. at 1025.
195
See SCHULHOFER, supra note 125, at 127 (implementing a new agency under the
executive branch would help oversee the intelligence gathering means). The creation of this
new office took the power of oversight away from the legislative body, effectively allowing
the executive branch to oversee itself. See id. (describing the methods of implementation).
The IRTPA also mandated a “Civil Liberties Oversight Board in the Executive Office of the
President, charged with providing advice to the president on the development and
implementation of national security policies that affect privacy and civil liberties.” Id.
196
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (2012) (designating a role for the executive branch in
the release of material support, but not the legislative branch); A Review of the Material Support
to Terrorism Prohibition Improvements Act: Hearing Before the S. Subcom. on Terrorism,
Technology, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Daniel Meron, Principal
Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen., Washington D.C.) (portraying the thought and revisions put into
the drafting of the material support statute to have a consensus in the fight against terrorism).
197
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (exploring the role of the executive branch in the release of
material support).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Compare Cole & Dempsey, supra note 110, at 138 (noting that the Secretary of State has
unchecked power when determining FTOs), with 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (putting no restrictions
on the executive branch when releasing material support).
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Subsection (j) mentions that an agent of the executive branch could
authorize the release of material support, but does not elaborate how the
executive branch should release the materials. 201 The difficulty in
determining how a FTO will use any received material support justifies
the legislative branch’s involvement.202 Amending the statute to include
the legislative branch would begin remedying the lack of guidance for the
executive branch by ensuring a second check on the executive branch’s
power.203
The negative effects of ambiguity highlight the need for further
clarification and definition of legislative branch’s role in negotiations with
FTOs.204 Amending the statute to include legislative notification in the
release of material support will help the executive and legislative branches
Precise
determine appropriate support for specific situations. 205
definitions allow the executive branch to adapt to changes in negotiations
and give the legislative branch the tools to oversee the process. 206 While
the interpretation and clarification of statutes is a job of the judiciary,
legislative involvement is a step to speed up the process as the judiciary
tends to move even more slowly than the legislative branch.207 Therefore,
201
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (defining the executive branch’s involvement in releasing
material support). The agent mentioned in the part (j) exception is the Secretary of State. Id.
The Secretary of State works as an agent of the President, in the greater executive branch of
the government. Id. Under the proposed amendment, the legislative branch would oversee
anyone from the executive branch who engaged in negotiations with FTOs and require a
report as dictated under the Case-Zablocki Act. See infra Part III.D (combining the material
support statute and the Case-Zablocki Act to create certainty in the roles of the executive and
legislative branches in foreign relations).
202
See generally JOHN ROLLINS & LIANA SUN WYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41004,
TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 21 (2012)
(relating the role played by the legislative branch in preventing transnational crime to the
oversight role it plays in that field).
203
See infra Part III.D.2 (commenting on the proposed increased role for the legislative
branch in foreign relations). While the scope of this Note only suggests an oversight role for
the legislative branch, more comprehensive measures may be needed to provide proper
guidance for the executive and legislative branches during negotiations with FTOs.
204
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (generalizing the methods for the executive branch to
release material support, and completely leaving out any role for the legislative branch).
205
See infra Part III.D (discussing the benefits of adding the Case-Zablocki Act procedures
directly into the material support statute).
206
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41333, TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT:
AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B, 1 (2010) (noticing the legislative branch’s
attempt to expand and clarify definitions of the material support statute); see also PERL, supra
note 109, at 4 (emphasizing the role of politics in definitions dealing with terrorism); ROLLINS
& WYLER, supra note 202, at 2 (noting the increase of other types of terrorist groups
threatening the United States).
207
See, e.g., Dames & Moore, v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (revealing that the role of
the judiciary is not to oversee the government action, but to provide support through
interpretation).
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the most efficient way to deal with ambiguity is to involve the legislative
branch in the process of releasing material support, particularly during
negotiations with FTOs.
The policies formed under the Constitution, case law, and statutes are
not the only thing stopping the legislative branch from obtaining more
influence in foreign relations, there is also the underlying cultural policy
that “the United States does not negotiate with terrorists.”208 The strength
and resolve of this statement created a backbone of American foreign
policy that continues to be found in contemporary issues.209 As this phrase
remains an integral portion of American foreign policy, the legislature will
have problems gaining traction in actively participating in negotiations
with FTOs.210 However, the makeup and needs of FTOs continue to
change because of the various avenues of support. 211 These changes, along
with an evolving American political landscape, open the door for the
legislative branch to participate in foreign negotiations.212
As FTOs evolve and new threats emerge, U.S. foreign relations
policies must change to meet each new situation.213 The legislative
branch’s opportunities to participate in foreign relations grow from the
Constitution’s ambiguity to the express involvement in the Case-Zablocki

See PERL, supra note 109, at 7–8 (providing examples of the United States’ interactions
with FTOs). Former CIA director James Woolsey noted that “[i]ncreasingly, terrorists don’t
just want a place at the table, but rather to destroy the table and all sitting there, possibly
with weapons of mass destruction.” Id. at 8.
209
See id. at 7–8 (highlighting the effects of not negotiating with terrorists).
210
See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012) (criminalizing giving support of any kind
of FTOs).
211
See PERL, supra note 109, at 6 (referencing the changing format of FTOs specifically that
fractured terrorist groups are a growing threat to the safety of the United States).
212
See infra Part III.D (providing a way for the legislative branch to participate in foreign
agreements).
213
See A Review of the Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Improvements Act, 109th Cong.
13 (2005) (statement of Andrew C. McCarthy, Senior Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies) (examining the ways the United States can meet the threat of new FTOs).
When discussing amendments to the material support statutes, Chairman Kyl recognized
that terrorist organizations constantly adapt methods of attack and organization to meet the
new statutes and roadblocks instituted by the United States. Id. To meet this growing
challenge, Chairman Kyl cautioned that the law must be as flexible as possible, while
retaining the tough stance against supplying FTOs. Id. To enhance the response of the
Federal Government in crime-terrorism, Congress has directed multiple federal agencies to
use diplomatic responses. Id. While issues may occur with time delays and having a
consensus, diplomacy is a viable alternative to force. See PERL, supra note 109, at 8 (“[G]roups
that are well-entrenched in a nation’s political fabric and culture, engaging the group might
be preferable to trying to exterminate it. Increasingly, governments appear to be pursuing
policies which involve verbal contact and even direct negotiations with terrorist groups or
their representatives.”); ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note 202, at 21 (emphasizing the role and
preference for diplomacy in situations concerning FTOs).
208
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Act.214 Likewise, the executive branch’s role transforms to meet new
concerns in dealing with FTOs. 215 The continuing expansion of foreign
relations elicits the need for a flexible, yet firm solution to evolving threats
from FTOs, ensuring a unified response to FTOs.216
D. Moving Toward a Solution: Combining the Case-Zablocki Act and the
Material Support Statute
Allowing the branches of the government to work together in foreign
relations is beneficial for presenting a unified front against terrorism. 217
While the executive branch relies on the “one-voice doctrine” in CurtissWright, this theory should not mean that the legislative branch loses all
power of oversight or communication with the executive branch in foreign
relations.218 The executive branch is responsible for negotiations with
foreign entities and retains autonomy to make instant decisions; however,
legislative involvement can assist in the process.219 Thus, the addition of
congressional notification into negotiations with FTOs encourages the
executive and legislative branches to work together without obstructing
the power of the executive branch to conduct foreign negotiations.
The executive branch’s ability to negotiate with FTOs, without
legislative branch involvement, may harm American interests. 220 The
purpose of enacting the material support statute was to protect American
interests by prohibiting American citizens from giving material support
to FTOs, even if the intention was humanitarian. 221 A unilateral
negotiation with a FTO requiring the release of material support could
214
See Adler, supra note 47, at 20–22 (discussing the evolution of Congress’ role in foreign
relations, primarily stemming from the Constitution); see also 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2012) (outlining
a specific role for the legislative branch in foreign relations).
215
See supra note 126 (comparing the old AEDPA role of the executive branch in releasing
material support with the new powers specifically granted under the IRTPA).
216
See infra Part III.D (providing a solution to the problem of minimal legislative
involvement in foreign relations).
217
See Moore, supra note 51, at 954–55 (explaining that the one-voice doctrine could be
helpful because it provides a united government front against threats to the country).
218
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (designating the
executive branch as the “sole organ” of foreign policy); Moore, supra note 51, at 973–74
(exploring the impact of Curtis-Wright’s use of the “one-voice” doctrine in holding that the
executive branch should be the “sole organ” of foreign relations).
219
See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (allowing the legislative branch to keep tabs on the actions taken
and agreements made by the executive branch without hindering the power of the executive
branch to conduct foreign negotiations).
220
See PERL, supra note 109, at 6–7 (evaluating the effect of changing power structures
within FTOs).
221
A Review of the Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Improvements Act, 109th Cong. 5–
6 (2005) (statement of Mr. Meron, Principal Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen., Civil Division, Dep’t of
Justice) (discussing Congress’ intent in creating a bipartisan plan to prevent groups from
providing material support as a way to combat terrorism before attacks occur).
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harm the American people because the executive branch could make a
mistake and release material that could be used militarily against
American interests.222 Additionally, the funds which would have been
used by the FTO to purchase material goods could be transferred to other
areas of the budget focusing on terrorist attacks.223 For example, assume
the FTO has to apply fifty percent of its budget to provide food for the
population and twenty-five percent of the budget applies to violent
activities. If the FTO receives food through a negotiation with the United
States, the money used to buy food could then be shifted to the terrorism
budget.224 The FTOs’ shift in funds after receiving material support
directly harms the United States because the more money a FTO can put
into military-like operations, the further those operations can reach.225 To
reduce the likelihood that a FTO will misuse the material support, the
executive and legislative branches should collaborate and share
intelligence information.226 Sharing the responsibility during interactions
with FTOs ensures that the executive branch will make well-informed
decisions that will not negatively affect U.S. citizens.
To fix the ambiguity and uncertainty of negotiations with FTOs, the
material support statute should be amended to include language from the
Case-Zablocki Act authorizing congressional notification of any foreign
negotiations by the executive branch.227 The current material support
statute contains some ambiguity, but this statute includes guidelines for
the executive branch in releasing material support to FTOs during
negotiations.228 The Constitution and contemporary examples show the
benefits of the legislative and executive branches working together in
foreign relations.229 Additionally, inclusion of procedures from the CaseZablocki Act regarding congressional notification provides a standard for
See PERL, supra note 109, at 5 (showing that the clandestine nature of FTOs hampers the
United States’ attempts to approach the groups diplomatically and usually requires more
intelligence officers on the ground).
223
See DOYLE, supra note 207, at 1–2 (explaining that giving material support to a FTO may
free up other resources that would later be used to conduct terrorist activities).
224
This hypothetical is the musing of the author.
225
See DOYLE, supra note 206, at 1–2 (relating the indirect relationship between giving
material support to a FTO and possible terrorist attacks).
226
See Spitzer, supra note 28, at 107 (stating that the legislative branch will have a
continuing role in releasing various forms of material support to foreign entities).
227
See supra Part III.B (introducing the Case-Zablocki Act); see also supra Part III.C
(discussing the various reasons the material support statute should include the legislative
branch in an oversight role).
228
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (2012) (prohibiting material support to FTOs); 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a)
(2012) (outlining the mandate that the executive branch report any international agreement
to the legislative branch).
229
See supra Part II.A, C (exhibiting an existing relationship between the executive and
legislative branches in foreign relations).
222
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the executive and legislative branches to collaborate in negotiating with
FTOs.230
Using accepted and established definitions, even if they are
ambiguous, helps the legislative branch determine whether the executive
branch complied with the terms of the material support statute during
negotiations. Although the executive branch has substantially defined
roles under the material support statute, the notification of the legislative
branch can provide effective oversight of any actions taken by the
executive branch.231 A well-developed statute regarding negotiations
with FTOs acts as a rubric for congressional oversight of the executive
branch. Any new addition to the statute must be workable for both
branches and the Case-Zablocki Act fulfills this need. 232 Thus, providing
specific directions to the legislative branch is the ultimate goal of
combining these two pieces of legislation.
Congressional notification of negotiations with FTOs does not
decrease the power of the executive branch. 233 The carefully enumerated
powers in the Constitution and the further limits on the reach of the
legislative branch in statutes retain the separation of powers.234 Even
though the legislative branch may direct portions of the executive
branch’s power, certain powers granted under the Constitution still rest
with the executive branch, such as foreign negotiations.235 The executive
branch conducts the actual negotiations with a FTO, but congressional
notification is a safeguard against releasing material support to FTOs who
may use the support for further terrorist attacks. 236 The executive branch
does not gain or lose any power in the following proposed statute; the
230
See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (providing procedures for the notification of the legislative
branch).
231
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (revealing the role of the executive branch in the release of
material support).
232
See 1 U.S.C. § 112b (showing that this statute was enacted in 1972 and has not been
substantively redefined since enactment, therefore showing a workable method of
notification).
233
See supra Part II.B (showing that when the legislative branch has oversight, the executive
branch is not hindered in any way).
234
See supra Part II.A (discussing the impact of the Constitution on the legislative branch’s
foreign relations powers).
235
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (giving the
executive branch broad foreign relations powers); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302e (1987) (reaffirming that the legislative branch
cannot itself negotiate, negotiation power rests solely with the executive branch).
236
See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (describing the role of the legislative branch to oversee the
international agreements of the executive branch); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (stating the role of the
executive branch to release material support when they deem it necessary); SCHULHOFER,
supra note 125, at 131 (strengthening the response to foreign threats requires the efforts of
both branches).
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only thing that is gained is a check on the uncontested power of the
executive branch in foreign negotiations.
1.

Proposed Amendment to the Material Support Statute to Include the
Notification Standards of the Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b

In its current form, the material support statute does not require
notification of the legislative branch when the executive branch releases
material support.237 To remedy this problem, the legislative branch
should amend the material support statute with the Case-Zablocki Act,
giving the legislative branch clear oversight over negotiations to release
material support. The material support statute should be amended to
include the following language:
(j) Exception.—No person may be prosecuted under this
section in connection with the term “personnel”,
“training”, or “expert advice or assistance” if the
provision of that material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization was approved by the
Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Attorney
General. The Secretary of State may not approve the
provision of any material support that may be used to
carry out terrorist activity (as defined in section
212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
(k) The Secretary of State must report any agreement to release
material support to Congress in compliance with the procedures
of the Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b.238
2.

Commentary

The proposed amendment to the material support statute rebalances
and strengthens the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches in three ways. First, the amendment merges the ability of the
executive branch to conduct negotiations on behalf of the United States,
with the notification and inclusion of the legislative branch. Second, the
amendment clarifies ambiguities of the material support statute by
providing a specific oversight role for the legislative branch. Third, the
amendment to the material support statute increases the flow of
information and communication between the branches, ensuring the
safety and progress of the United States’ foreign policy agenda.
237
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(j) (neglecting to include the legislative branch in the release of
material support).
238
The proposed amendment, in italics, is the contribution of the author. See 1 U.S.C.
§ 112b(a) (providing the base language for the proposed amendment).
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Amending the material support statute begins to repair the damage done
by Justice Sutherland’s dicta in Curtiss-Wright, which delegated foreign
relations power to the executive branch. The legislative branch attempted
to fix this issue through the Case-Zablocki Act, but the discourse was
deeply ingrained in foreign relations so its enactment had little effect.
This proposed amendment does not take away any power from the
executive branch to respond quickly to a national security threat. The
legislative branch’s involvement does not occur until after the executive
branch enters negotiations to release material support. 239 Within the CaseZablocki Act, the executive branch must notify the legislative branch “as
soon as practicable.”240 Notifying the legislative branch does not hamper
the executive branch’s ability to freely negotiate with FTOs because the
executive branch will conclude negotiations by the time it notifies the
legislative branch.241 Additionally, the transparency created by this
amendment would not lead to security leaks. The Case-Zablocki Act
already includes provisions for how the legislative branch should handle
confidential information.242 These safeguards protect the sensitive nature
of negotiations for material support. Thus, including the legislative
branch in foreign relations enhances the efficiency of the government and
guarantees the protection of the most sensitive materials.243
By inserting the Case-Zablocki Act’s clear language directly into the
material support statute, the legislative branch will be more inclined to
enforce it. Critics may argue that the amendment is too miniscule or naive
to make any sweeping changes in the role of the legislative branch in
foreign relations, but the Case-Zablocki Act was enacted in the 1970s, and
yet the legislative branch does not utilize this important tool. The CaseZablocki Act is not a perfect solution for balancing the foreign relations
powers, but legislative oversight is a powerful tool that should be
reinstated.
239
Id. (regulating the legislative branch’s notification to “after such agreement has entered
into force”).
240
Id.
241
See id. (mandating that the executive branch contact the legislative branch after the
agreement is complete); Oleszek & Oleszek, supra note 70, at 48 (stating that the legislative
and executive branches have worked together before on projects like NATO and the
Marshall Plan).
242
See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (communicating that if the agreement could cause national
security issues, the executive branch should notify the Committee on Foreign Relations in
the Senate and the Committee on International Relations in the House of Representatives);
see also Oleszek & Oleszek, supra note 70, at 64 (explaining the need to conduct some
oversight in secret to protect the country).
243
See Oleszek & Oleszek, supra note 70, at 60 (finding that notification and oversight are
important to provide transparency so that the American people can make informed decisions
at election time).
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Incorporating legislative oversight diminishes threats to American
assets rather than the regulation of government contracts and foreign
corporations. Critics of this amendment may state that the focus of the
legislative branch’s oversight should not be on the executive branch, but
on government contracts or foreign companies. The material support
statute already addresses this issue by limiting the interactions between
private companies, individuals, and FTOs. Focusing on private entities
would detract from the primary goal of this Note, which is to advocate for
the legislative branch’s increased involvement in foreign relations. If the
United States deals with a threat requiring the release of material support,
the proposed amendment provides a comprehensive plan to deal with
that threat and assures the continued safety of the American people.
IV. CONCLUSION
Including the Case-Zablocki Act in the material support statute
provides the legislative branch with the power to influence the actions of
the executive branch. The Constitution allows the legislative branch some
oversight in foreign relations, but the introduction of Curtiss-Wright halted
the possibility of extending that power. Retaining the constitutionally
protected rights of “Advice and Consent” and appropriations control
permitted the legislative branch to minimally influence foreign policy.
The enactment of the Case-Zablocki Act marked a turning point for the
legislative branch. Tired of the marginalization, the legislative branch
created a statute mandating the notification of any international
agreement. Unfortunately, the Case-Zablocki Act is not enforced, and the
involvement of the legislative branch in foreign relations remains small.
In the specialized field of foreign negotiations for the release of material
support, the introduction of the Case-Zablocki Act recreates the lost
influence and oversight of the legislative branch, instituting a way for the
legislative branch to rein in unchecked power of the executive branch in
foreign relations.
Returning to the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this Note,
Senator Jones realizes the hidden potential of the legislative branch to
influence foreign policy and returns to chambers energized to rally fellow
Senators to enforce the Case-Zablocki Act. As compared with the status
quo, where few directions for the executive and legislative branches exist
on negotiating with FTOs, this amendment offers a practical solution
without infringing the separation of powers. The statute allows the
executive branch to conduct the negotiations, but involves the legislative
branch in a consultation and oversight role. To prevent a potential foreign
relations disaster, this proposed statute provides a safeguard against
inadvertently giving FTOs access to “material support” that could be used
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to create or purchase weapons. The addition to this statute will increase
communication between the two branches of government and help the
government to act in the best interest of the American people.
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